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Abstract
In an interview published in Wired magazine on November 12, 2013, Steven
Levy asked Bill Gates, in virtue of recent NSA revelations, “What is the proper balance
of surveillance and security, and where do we go from here?” 1 Gates responded,
“Historically, privacy was almost implicit, because it was hard to find and gather
information. But in the digital world, whether it's digital cameras or satellites or just what
you click on, we need to have more explicit rules - not just for governments but for
private companies.”2 In many ways Gates’ thought anticipates my project. In the pages
to follow, I will outline how, under current conditions, the rise of mass data collection
will give way to mass blackmail of private citizens per ideas put forth by Bernard
Mandeville, Daniel Ellsberg, and others. Additionally, I will show how, even if this mass
blackmail campaign improves the overall economy as well as the behavior of the vast
majority of actors, it is still harmful in virtue of its explicit disregard for personhood (as
defined by Charles Taylor) since it invades one’s privacy and alters cognitive
development. This part of the paper will also reference relevant selections from James
Rachels, Charles Fried, and Stanley Benn, and will give an account of privacy that
precludes significant incursion even if that incursion could be justified in a utilitarian
sense.

1

Levy, Steven. "Bill Gates and President Bill Clinton on the NSA, Safe Sex, and
American Exceptionalism." Wired. Conde Nast, 12 Nov. 2013. Web. 27 Feb.

2

Ibid.
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Chapter 1: Introduction—A Brief History of Everything

Troubled Beginnings
If you’re reading this, you’re being watched. Should you happen to be one of
those perverts who takes this to mean he’s important and derive pleasure or self-worth
from it, let me assure you, you’re nothing wonderful. Even people in the decidedly larger
set of ‘those not reading this’ are suffering the same fate and it’s been going on since
before any of us were born. All the way back in the Middle Pleistocene, pre-Napoleon,
Nero, and Nimrod, early man crawled out from the depths of the sea to get a breath of the
quaint, unindustrialized atmosphere. He travelled an aimless, untraceable path, treaded
throughways never before taken, and, according to various theologians, even he was
being watched by a voyeuristic fellow in the sky named God who apparently found the
whole thing rather amusing. It took us nearly 200,000 years, but through perseverance
and selective breeding that original class of modest Homo sapiens eventually gave rise to
a strain of television executive types born with the necessary confluence of narcissism
and ambition to imagine themselves in the divine creator’s place—a captain’s chair
before an array of infinite monitors, observing and controlling the entire human race.
Now, just as they did in Boston after Super Bowl XLII and across the globe on
November 8, 2016, we sit stunned, scratching our heads and asking ‘How?’ Perhaps we
told ourselves for too long that rationality and advanced consciousness were tools for
peace and liberty. If these concepts ever converge, it is only a happy accident, and a brief
one at that. As we’ll come to understand, for all our ‘rational’ behavior and capacity for
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‘higher’ thinking, we are rather irrational and shortsighted beings when it comes to the
matter of that most precious task: the progress and preservation of our own species.
A population that spent more time watching reality than reality television might
have been apt to anticipate the potential dangers of Big Data collection before they
revealed themselves, but unfortunately we thrive on distraction. We must now navigate a
world that comes fully equipped with a vast spying apparatus and the embedded ethical
and institutional justifications to use it quite deviously. Barring a change in present
conditions, the ambitious elites among us will soon realize their goal of unseating God
and controlling the population at large with the threat of blackmail, using information
accrued while the rest of us were too busy arguing such a reality could never come to be.

Groundwork for Blackmail
Now that I’ve painted a sufficiently pessimistic picture I’ll offer the (relatively)
good news. In the social realm, actors are not chemical reactions. Dropped in even a
seemingly hopeless situation, it is at least plausible that we can reason our way out.
Furthermore, just as even the worst player cannot lose a game of chess on the first move,
even the most sinister actor cannot perform his most devastating act without the
convenience of certain vulnerabilities. Therefore, I will argue for three necessary but not
sufficient conditions that lay the groundwork for the blackmail of private citizens by
government and corporate institutions. If these conditions are met and the subsequent
line of argumentation succeeds, then we have the necessary inputs to obtain the output of
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mass blackmail.3 You might complain that what I termed ‘good news’ sounds anything
but good, but remember only once we know what it takes to create the nasty blackmail
outcome, can we work toward preventing it.

The three conditions:
1. It must be the case that powerful institutions can collect and process massive
amounts of data/metadata on a wide swath of citizens.
2. It must also be the case that powerful institutions use utilitarian criteria for
what counts as right and wrong, which causes them to overlook the value of privacy.
3. Game Theory should suggest that blackmail is a likely progression from mass
data collection and mining that currently exists.

This should even apply to those

institutions that were previously opposed to data collection and blackmail.

Further, I will counter-object to rebuttals that attempt to argue against the
blackmail outcome or justify its existence. This will require an investigation into what
privacy is and how privacy invasion affects normative development and harms persons.
Through this investigation, I will demonstrate that outside of altering at least one of the
three conditions or subjecting ourselves to an at least equally bad consequence, there is
no promising solution to the problem as I have imagined it. Likewise, there is no
reasonable justification for it. Thus, we must accept that we are travelling a cruel, narrow
road toward authoritarianism and work with diligence and optimism to alter our course.

3

The outcome is highly likely, troublingly likely in fact, but not guaranteed, hence my
omission of ‘sufficient’. Nonetheless, this omission should not be too comforting, and
should certainly not inspire anything close to complacency.
3

Chapter 2: Surprise! Your Daughter is Pregnant

Data Collection and Processing
At the Parthenon in Greece, on the ground where Western philosophy was forged,
in the hall of truths, there is a linen closet, out of sight, near the back, where the
unpopular facts reside. In this closet you can encounter claims like ‘Climate change is
real’, ‘Vaccines don’t cause autism’, and ‘Corporate and government entities collect and
analyze data on private citizens’. Each of these is veracious and well-sourced, but
somehow 40-45% of the population still resists them like insulators in our human circuit.
As a result, I feel that even though there can be no reasonable objection to my claiming
that powerful institutions do indeed collect, source, and store data on private citizens, it is
necessary to justify this fact in the face of stubborn opposition.
Surveillance and the dangers of Big Data are among the subjects every voracious
cable news watcher has fancied himself an expert in since 2013, but at the risk of
alienating these distinguished intellectuals, I’d like to suggest that any serious discussion
about the reality and potential harm of mass data collection is not reducible to selected
George Orwell quotes or a constitution of libertarian platitudes. Just as all discussion of
political figures eventually devolves into comparisons to Hitler, all debate over the nature
of government and privacy now reduces to semi-coherent tangents on the NSA and the
prophetic nature of 1984. However, singling out the NSA as the lone, rogue actor in the
world of data collection is similar to pinning the MLB’s steroid era squarely on Barry
Bonds just because he was the most polarizing and successful figure of the time. Back in
May of 2013, when Republicans still liked intelligence leaks, Edward Snowden ruffled
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more than a few feathers after he revealed just how comprehensive the NSA’s
intelligence-gathering program was, but even then and especially now, data collection is
so widespread that consumers cannot escape it and have already (perhaps even
unwittingly) given up too much information about themselves to ever hope for the
proverbial tabula rasa.
In the introduction to his book, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect
your Data and Control your World, Bruce Schneier writes of data collection, “It’s not
just the cell phone location data I’ve described. It’s also data about our phone calls, emails, and text messages, plus all the webpages we read, our financial transaction data,
and much more”. 4 In other words, American citizens are already complicit in the
fulfillment of the first half of the first condition necessary to run the blackmail
argument—the collection of mass amounts of data/metadata.5 If you live in America in
2017, you exhale not only oxygen, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen, but also huge quantities
4

Schneier, Bruce. Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and
Control Your World. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2015. Print. 5.
5
A brief passage from Bruce Schneier’s Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect
your Data and Control your World is quite helpful here, “One way to think about it is
that data is content, and metadata is context. Metadata can be much more revealing than
data, especially when collected in the aggregate” (Schneier 75-76). Essentially, data
collection would reveal something like the content of your telephone conversation, while
metadata collection would reveal the speakers as well as the timing, length, and
frequency of the calls but not the actual words or phrases used in those calls. Lest you
think metadata is somehow inferior to pure data as a result of the U.S. government’s
dismissal of it following Edward Snowden’s reveal of the NSA’s domestic metadata
dragnet, remember “In 2014, former NSA and CIA director Michael Hayden remarked,
‘We kill people based on metadata’ (Schneier 76). Suppose God could only receive the
location, length, and frequency of your prayers, but never the content. He would still be
able to interpret a great deal about you based upon that information. For instance, God
could probably tell a ‘good’ Christian from a ‘bad’ Christian because the ‘bad’
Christian’s prayers would only occur briefly during Easter, Christmas, Super Bowl
Sunday, and big frightening tropical storms and other strange weather events. He would
not even need the contents of these prayers to make educated inferences about the people
making them. Likewise, much can be gleaned from the metadata of our conversations.
5

of data, and your exhaust no longer dissipates into the ether as it might have years ago.
Now the NSA has it, Google has it, Facebook has it, Target has it, your bank has it, and
the list goes on.
Of course, there is a meaningful difference between bulk data/metadata collection
and the successful navigation of that data/metadata. Imagine a geologist who drops a net
so big that he is able to collect every rock in the Sahara Desert. He claims to possess tens
of thousands of rare, important fossils, but when asked to produce them, he asserts he
cannot because he does not have the time or manpower to actually sift through his net and
find the fossils. If data/metadata collection is analogous to the geologist’s predicament in
our example, then all the data collection in the world is still rendered meaningless
because there is no possibility of separating important trends and information from the
general pool of data. Fortunately for the argument, and unfortunately for us, it has
become clearer and clearer of late that companies and government agencies prefer bulk
data collection specifically because they now have the ability to glean trends and sort
through it in a way they were not able to even as recently as fifteen years ago.
Nowadays, “Big data6 sets derive value, in part, from the inferences that can be made
from them”.7

Further, “computing power is…doubling every eighteen months”8 and

“what is clear is that data-mining9 technology is becoming increasingly powerful and is

6

From Schneier, “The general practice of amassing and saving all kinds of data”. Big
data sets contain too much information for any human to reasonably process them and
gain any realistic insight. However, computers do possess the power to rifle through
these data sets and make surprisingly accurate judgments and conclusions as a result.
7
Ibid. 116-117.
8
Ibid 120.
9
“The science and engineering of extracting useful information from [big data sets]”
according to Schneier.
6

enabling observers to draw ever more startling conclusions from big data sets”. 10
Returning to our original example, we can imagine the value in our geologist dropping
his big net if he possesses a device that allows him to quickly scan the rocks collected
and determine which are important fossil specimens and which are merely sedimentary.
This is akin to what quantitative computer analysis has done to the world of data
collection.
On a more sinister note, a recent paper written by Jessica Su, Sharad Goel, Ansh
Shukla, and Arvind Narayanan contains evidence that the online advertising industry,
which “builds browsing histories of individuals via third-party trackers embedded on web
pages”11 has been lying when they “promise users that the histories are pseudonymous
and not linked to identity”.12 In their paper, the authors “show that browsing histories can
be linked to social media profiles such as Twitter, Facebook, or Reddit accounts”.13 This
means companies that claim they are only tracking your browsing by assigning you a
randomly generated pseudonym so they can aggregate clicks and advertise effectively
can actually, quite reliably, figure out exactly who you are by matching the unique
characteristics of your particular browsing ‘feed’ with various social media accounts.
Ignoring the myriad of incidental problems this creates, we can, for our purposes in this
chapter, simply conclude that if these online aggregators had no desire to use the
deanonymizing power of their algorithms, they would have pointed out the problem to

10

Ibid 121.
Su, Jessica, Sharad Goel, Ansh Shukla, and Arvind Narayanan. "De-anonymizing Web
Browsing Data with Social Networks." (2017): 291-304. Web. 17 Feb. 2017. 1
12 Ibid 1.
13 Ibid 1.
11
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relevant authorities long before a group of Stanford researchers independently discovered
it.

Real World Examples
If you’re unconvinced by abstract concepts or too dull to abstract from them to
real life dangers yourself, please continue below onto the provided list of recent, alarming
data collection cases to help stimulate your imagination.

•

In 2010, Google CEO Eric Schmidt admitted: “We know where you are. We
know where you’ve been. We can more or less know what you’re thinking
about”.14

•

In a now infamous case, Andrew Pole, a statistician working for Target, was able
to create an algorithm based on customer purchasing trends that led Target to
correctly identify a teen’s pregnancy before she had even broken the news to her
parents.15

•

In 2010, Kalev Leetaru, a researcher from the University of Illinois, compiled
over 100 million news stories from the U.S. Government’s Open Source Center,
BBC Monitoring, and The New York Times Archive dating back to 1945, and fed
these into the supercomputer Nautilus. After mining the data, all 100 million

14
15

Schneier. 74.
Duhigg, Charles. "How Companies Learn Your Secrets." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 18 Feb. 2012. Web. 04 Oct. 2016.
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articles were woven into a networked mesh with some 100 trillion
interconnections. By analyzing this data, Leetaru and Nautilus were able to
predict Osama bin Laden’s location within 125 miles in Pakistan when top experts
still claimed he was living in Afghanistan. Additionally, the computer’s outputs
suggested the eruption of the Arab Spring, which happened the very next year.16

•

In 2013, Facebook was able to send targeted ads to a user known as ‘Matt’ who
was struggling to come out of the closet. Facebook predicted his struggles using
only two comments, two page ‘likes’, and Matt’s age, gender, and browsing
habits.17

Conclusion
Mass data collection is no longer the stuff of science fiction movies and dystopian
novels. It is a reality of the world in which we live. This is justifiably alarming to many;
though there remain some intrepid apologists capable of repressing their anxiety by
repeating the surveillance state’s favorite cliché: ‘Why should I worry? I have nothing to
hide.’ You might notice, though, that these people with ‘nothing to hide’ still walk
around fully clothed, lock their doors at night, close their blinds, delete their browser
histories, disguise their pin codes at the ATM, won’t give you their social media
passwords, refuse to release their medical records, scoff at the notion of live streaming

16

Anthony, Sebastian. "Supercomputer Predicts Egyptian Revolution, Bin Laden’s
Location | ExtremeTech." ExtremeTech. N.p., 12 Sept. 2011. Web. 04 Oct. 2016.
17
Green, Jon. "Facebook Knows You're Gay before You Do." AMERICAblog News Gay
RSS. N.p., 24 Mar. 2013. Web. 04 Oct. 2016.

9

their sex lives, and get irrationally angry when you scrawl their phone numbers in a dirty,
7/11 bathroom stall. The point here is: we all have things we would prefer to keep secret.
Some may be worse than others, but everyone has ‘something to hide’, and that being the
case, we ought to be especially concerned about how those ‘somethings’ could be used
against us now that mass data collection is a normalized reality.

10

Chapter 2.5: An Intermission for Ethics

Grounding for Future Discussion:
In the succeeding chapters, I make frequent references to ethics (in business and
private life), but I’ve realized that I do so with the presumption of a robust, universal
understanding of what that slippery term actually entails. Considering the fervent debate
amongst philosophers over what qualifies as a good ethical theory, my presumption
seems more likely to lead to confusion than elucidation. To alleviate this confusion, I am
going to lay out, in general terms, what we ought to expect from a good ethical theory
and what can absolutely not be permitted. This will inform my evaluation of businesses’
behavior in later chapters.
The 3 General Goals of Ethical Theories:
1. At its broadest, an ethical theory should aim to make normative statements by
reflecting on the body of moral practice observable in society. This does not mean an
ethical theory must condone prominent ethical practices, but it ought to provide criteria
for evaluating what counts as morally right or wrong. Thus, “an [ethical theory]…
specifies what characteristics all moral actions must possess”. 18 For instance, in a
utilitarian ethical theory, the principle of utility is the criteria by which we evaluate the
morality of any action. Any sufficient ethical theory should have some sort of guiding
principle as such.

18

Dixon, M. "Normative Ethical Theories." Normative Ethical Theories. Web. 29 Apr.
2015.
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2. An ethical theory should provide justificatory, not explanatory, reasons for
action because, from the ethical perspective, we are not interested in what caused an act
to occur but whether the act ought or ought not have been done. To help explain the
distinction, we might imagine one of Socrates’ disciples asking him near the end of his
life, ‘Why are you in prison?’ Socrates could respond: ‘Because the bars prevent my
escape’, but this obviously ignores the aim of the initial question. In the field of ethical
theory, giving explanatory reasons in place of normative, justificatory reasons involves a
similar mistake. As ethical theorists investigating Socrates’ imprisonment, we do not
want to know that Socrates is in prison because a guard locked him in. Our focus is on
whether Socrates ought to have been imprisoned. This should all make perfect sense
when we consider that normative claims are not true or false based on empirical data, but
are instead, evaluative, meaning they state how the world ought to be. Thus, ethical
theories should focus on justificatory claims because explanatory claims miss the point of
the initial inquiry.
3. Ethical theories ought to be objective and relational when considering value.
That is, a good ethical theory should reject both subjectivism and absolutism and accept:
A. that normative claims can be either true or false in virtue of the non-absolute concepts
through which we experience the world and B. that moral claims are objective and can
succeed or fail to accurately describe reality. I expect this last criterion will inspire the
most resistance of the three because of its peculiar ability to unite natural enemies—
devout scientists and obedient theologians, bleeding-heart liberals and proto-fascist
conservatives—against itself. Although they may disagree on the solution (absolutism or
subjectivism), classes composed of polar opposite individuals often find themselves in
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agreement about the need to reject an objective-relational interpretation of normativity
because it threatens their own worldviews. However, the disturbance of an imprudent
philosophy is no reason to postpone the quest for truth; indeed, it may even provide
greater justification for such a search. Thus, I will defend the objective-relational nature
of normative claims by first rebuking both the absolutist and subjectivist pictures, and
then offering a replacement, positive account.
Absolutism, or the idea that there is a non-relational, ‘true’ reality that some mode
of inquiry will give us access to, relies on the notion that we can somehow escape the
categories that shape our experience and get a glimpse of what Kant would call the
Noumenal world or the world ‘as it really is’.

This leads absolutists to defend

Eliminativist positions, which preclude the truth of normative judgments necessary for an
ethical theory. Normative claims, the absolutist says, are not part of the true fabric of
reality that our mode of inquiry reveals to us. As a side note, whether this proposed
mode of inquiry is religious in nature or scientific (as is more often the case presently) is
irrelevant. What matters is the apparently outrageous claim that we can, in principle,
experience the world from an external point of view, whatever the medium for such
insight may be. John McDowell argues against this notion in his seminal work ‘Aesthetic
Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World’ in which he systematically dismantles
J.L. Mackie’s and Bernard Williams’ absolute conceptions of reality. As McDowell puts
it, “It is natural to wonder whether the idea of transcending special points of view really
makes sense. Surely any conception of reality we could achieve would still be our
conception of reality, from a point of view we occupied; the idea of a view from nowhere
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is incoherent”.19 If, as McDowell channeling Kant suggests, our experience is shaped by
linguistic categories, then any attempt to make claims about reality outside of those
categories will be nonsense because there is no point of view we could possibly adopt
that would not be our own point of view, still limited by the very same categories we
were trying to escape. If this privileged point of view from nowhere is not possible,
absolutism fails.
On the other hand, subjectivists define truth as how something feels to the person
experiencing it, such that, the phenomenological feel of an experience comports directly
to the truth of said experience. As a result, subjectivists tend to be moral relativists
because the truth of any ethical claim depends only on how it seems to any given
individual. Ludwig Wittgenstein famously challenged the subjectivist ontology when he
outlined an argument against essentially private languages in his Philosophical
Investigations. The argument, reproduced in a paraphrased form here, claims:
1. Subjectivism requires that something is true or false in virtue of how it feels to the
person experiencing it.
2. Subjectivism prevents the possibility of errors. (If truth only involves how something
seems to me, it is impossible for me to be mistaken about it).
3.

For a language to be meaningful, it must include the possibility of mistaken

identification.
Conclusion: Subjectivism is meaningless.20

19

McDowell, John Henry. "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the
World." Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998. 112-30.
Print. 118.
20 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1968. Print.
§243-§271.
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As Wittgenstein’s argument shows, the subjectivists must have the wrong conception of
truth since we do not have a meaningless essentially private language, but a public one
that can be described in functional terms.
Even though it would prevent stress and toil, I don’t want to commit myself to
fallacy à la Quine’s false trichotemy by suggesting the mere failure of absolutism and
subjectivism implies the truth of the objective-relational view. Instead, I will draw a
positive argument to justify the claim that normative judgments actually identify
something real in the world and can be true or false. Traditionally, opponents of moral
realism have held the view that normative claims cannot be true because they do not refer
to anything actually in the world. True enough, one cannot point to a normative claim as
easily as he can the White House, and the appropriateness of our moral actions is not
weighed with the same precision as a smallmouth bass. However, this shouldn’t be too
discouraging and certainly shouldn’t lead one to moral skepticism because this objection
relies on a mistaken notion of what normative claims actually describe. That is, the
moral skeptic (whether he knows it or not) is reifying normativity. He is arguing that
normative claims ought to identify some substance in the world, but this is not the only
way for a claim to be meaningful.
In the vein of Gilbert Ryle, consider this: I walk into my dorm room twirling one
of those thin, stretchy produce bags from the grocery store around my index finger. My
roommate, Jamie, who happens to be sitting on the couch, asks me what I’ve got. I
respond, ‘I bought a dozen apples.’ He says ‘Show me.’ One by one I pull out crisp,
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green Granny Smiths until I’ve revealed all twelve. Jamie gives me a bewildered look
and says, ‘But where’s the dozen?’21
This is an example of what the moral skeptic does to normative claims. In the
apple example, the dozen is not something independent of the twelve apples that
comprise it—it is a feature of them. We should not expect a different substance called
‘dozen’ to appear when I empty out my produce bag. Likewise, we should not expect the
normative claim, as some kind of Platonic form, to exist as a substance in the observable
world. Of course, we cannot perform brain surgery on someone and use a pair of pliers
to extract their moral judgments the same way we could extract their medulla oblongata.
However, the reason we cannot steal someone’s normative judgments in this way is that
normative claims are features of action just as thoughts are features of experience and not
separate substances from the brain that produces them. When we act, freely and with
intention, belief, and desire, normative claims become possible, and while they are not
graspable in the physical sense, they are real features of our experience.
To review, a good ethical theory should reject absolutism and subjectivism and
accept an objective-relational view—that is, objective in the sense that reality can be
misdescribed and relational in the sense that the only way to describe reality is through a
set of concepts that provide the necessary features of experience. Further, normative
claims can be true or false and do identify something22 real in the world, which justifies
the ethical theory project.

21

Inspired by the University/parts of the University thought experiment found in Ryle,
Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949. Print.
22 Not some thing.
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Necessary Features of a Good Ethical Theory:
Since we’ve established that normative claims are real and worth investigating, it
is now sensible to more closely examine the features of several prominent ethical theories
to determine whether or not they warrant inclusion in our ideal theory.
I will start by reviewing the four major features of utilitarianism:
consequentialism, monism about non-instrumental value, a maximizing view of
rationality, and impartiality in moral considerations. Of these, only impartiality fits
completely with normative ethics.
Pure consequentialism must be rejected on the grounds that certain institutions
like slavery seem wrong for reasons other than their consequences. To use Kant’s words,
it appears that a better explanation for why slavery is wrong is that, in using someone as a
slave, the slave owner does not “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in
your own person or the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the
same time as an end”.23 If pure consequentialism cannot adequately capture what is
inherently wrong with slavery, then it would be an insufficient feature of a good ethical
theory.
Utilitarianism also requires one to be a monist with respect to non-instrumental
value. Utilitarians claim that there is only one thing with intrinsic value—formerly
happiness, and probably some conception of ‘goodness’ in more contemporary times.
Aristotle’s theory of eudemonia rejects this claim.

In Aristotelian virtue theory,

“virtues… have profiles containing a plurality of functions, a plurality of modes of moral
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acknowledgement, and a plurality of targets”.24 As the Aristotelian theory demonstrates,
non-instrumental value cannot be captured by monism because living well requires the
acquisition of virtues whose value is not simply reducible to the actions they prescribe.
Thus, we need a pluralistic view of eudemonia to adequately capture what it means to
live a good, flourishing life.
Finally, we can reject the maximizing view of rationality by appealing to
satisficing theory. From inside the utilitarian perspective, a maximizing view appears
obvious because utilitarians are consequentialists and “once we make the consequentialist
move and declare that the only features of actions relevant to moral evaluation are their
consequences, we seem to have every reason to strive to bring about the best
consequences we can”.25 However, we have already shown that pure consequentialism is
not consistent with a good ethical theory and as a result, we can reject maximizing theory
and replace it with satisficing theory because results are not all that matters; thus,
sometimes a satisficing view will be consistent with morality.
An inspection of the features of Kantian theory reveals that, while his notion of
respecting persons as persons is an integral part of a good ethical theory, his purely nonconsequentialist view fails to capture something inherent in our moral thinking. Consider
these two similar scenarios: In the first, we are given the choice of killing one person to
save five lives. In the second, we are given the choice of killing one person to save five
million lives. We are more compelled to kill the single person in the second example, but
24
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our reason for doing so is inherently consequentialist. That is to say, we feel we have
better reason to kill the single person in example two because the stakes are higher—
more people will die as a result of our inaction than in example one. If this is true, then
outcomes matter morally.

Therefore, although it would be wrong to include pure

consequentialism in a good ethical theory, it would also be wrong to include pure nonconsequentialism.
We should also recognize that a good ethical theory cannot be composed of
merely first order rules because rules underdetermine morality. Per Wittgenstein’s notion
of the open-textured word, “careful examination of actual speech situations shows that in
no case can a single rule account for the countless variety of uses to which an individual
word may be put”.26 In other words, rules do not determine how they themselves are to
be applied. This is a problem for any rule-based ethical theory that intends to give
conclusive, closed-circuit reasons for action. The problem here is, conclusive rules are
circumstance-specific because they must include all exceptions to themselves. However,
it is not possible to list all exceptions to a rule without placing restrictions, like specific
circumstances, on that rule. As a result, ethical theories cannot consist of conclusive
rules, but must instead express good reasons for action.
A good ethical theory must also include parts-whole relationships and expressive
relationships in addition to the typical means-end relationship. Let’s tackled parts-whole
relationships first. These relationships essentially account for the now cliché notion that
happiness is journey not a destination. Put in terms of friendship, acquiring friends and
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spending time with them is not simply a means to eudemonia, but is actually a part of
eudemonia. Thus, a means-ends relationship would not be able to adequately capture this
part of morality. Too often we see the paradigm case of a means-end misapplication in
the form of a depressed celebrity who assumed their success in some field was a means to
the end of happiness when really their success ought to have been a part of happiness the
whole time.
Expressive relationships explain how our attitudinal states can impact our
worldview. Suppose every time I see a pretty picture I spit on it and grimace. These acts
express a vice and that expression will sour my outlook and make me less receptive to my
surroundings. If, as a result of my sour demeanor, I enter situations without a reasonable
amount of goodwill, then I cannot possibly interact well with others, and, as such, cannot
live a good life.

Hence, our ideal ethical theory needs to account for expressive

relationships in order to ensure that our actions reflect virtue and good will.
Conclusion:
To recap, a good ethical theory aims to explain moral practices by giving criteria
for what counts as morally right and wrong through objective-relational, justificatory,
normative statements. It should include certain features of utilitarianism, Kantian theory,
and Aristotelian virtue theory, but none of these is sufficient in and of itself. It should not
be composed merely of first-order rules, and must include parts-whole relationships and
expressive relationships in addition to means-end relationships. From now on, when I
speak of ‘normative ethics’, it is a theory with these attributes that I have in mind.
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Chapter 3: Unsafe at Any Place

Where Sleeping Mill’s Lie—The Trouble with Business Ethics
My good friend Brad used to tell a joke. “It goes like this,” he would say,
“Business ethics.” If my father happened to overhear27, he’d come leaping over like a
jackal and dive straight into his prefabricated rant about freedom, economics, and all that
Edmund Burke bullshit, and I’ve learned a well-adjusted man28 doesn’t just come undone
like that unless something cuts deep, so there must’ve been some truth to Brad’s little
gag. In a country that unironically took Gordon Gekko and Jay Gatsby at face value, and
has made a habit of vilifying the poor as lazy, dumb, freeloaders, perhaps it’s actually the
temporarily embarrassed millionaires like my father who are most averse to ethical
regulation. Maybe they lie awake at night and lament that intuitive inclination for justice
that settled in the pit of their stomachs somewhere around 1969 and kept them from
going for the jugular and making their fortune. Maybe it all just trickles down from the
51st floor boardrooms.
In any case, the cliché of the venal, greedy businessman is prevalent enough that
plenty of people would likely accept, out of hand, the idea that businesses will encroach
on someone’s private life provided it serves their bottom line. However, this is more an
excuse to cop-out on defending the premise than it is a legitimate argument. After all,
anyone with a nuanced view of the world can surely accept that there isn’t some mystical,
magnetic force attracting only the most vile, contemptible folks toward careers in big
business. In fact, there are plenty of businesspeople who, in a vacuum, appear charitable
27
28

And we often made sure he did.
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and empathetic. I for one do not believe it is necessarily the quality of the people that
make up the business world that leads it to value profit over privacy. Rather, it is the
regularly unmentioned utilitarian compass built into our business institutional structure
that encourages these people to act in a way counter to normative ethics and often counter
to their own values.
Of course, encouragement to behave unethically is not analogous to gravitational
pull; there is no guarantee that simply because a system encourages unethical behavior
that any unethical behavior will occur. Instead, it might be easier to suppose we are
detectives investigating the cause of a house fire and we want to make the case that the
homeowners should have expected their house would burn down given a specific set of
circumstances. While this section will not make the case that there is no way for a
business to avoid unethical behavior, it will argue that we ought to expect unethical
behavior from businesses because of their structure.

The Fable of the Bees
People have been put to death for less, but perhaps it is not so outrageous to
claim, in a capitalist economic system, morality and business mix about as well as oil and
water. Bernard Mandeville developed this very idea in his poem, “The Fable of the
Bees”, back in 1705. In his work, a hive of corrupt but prosperous bees demand more
moral regulation and wind up sacrificing their prosperity in the process. As a result,
George Bragues concludes Mandeville means to advance the idea that “Selfishness drives
the commercial system that creates wealth benefits, while self-denial would create
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poverty”.29 Many have since referred to this concept as private vice for public gain.30 If
Mandeville and Bragues are correct, then the introduction of ethical standards to the
business world runs counter to the project of private enterprise—wealth and product
generation.

Of course, how true the notion of private vice for public gain was in

Mandeville’s time31 remains a matter of contention. Certainly, though, in the context of
this project, we ought to be skeptical about any promise that private vice will indeed
result in public gain.32
Nonetheless, Mandeville’s work does give voice to a real problem (however crude
his diagnosis may be), and it’s one related to the ethical investigation of Chapter 2.5. Our
inability to combine commercial practices with normative ethics arises from the cryptic
utilitarianism33 that underscores a business’s behavior in capitalist economies. It is, in
effect, the pre ‘business ethics’ ethic of the commercial system, and this hidden ethical
arrangement is what causes the friction between businesses and normative ethics. In a
capitalist framework, companies look to maximize profit because greater profits equate to
29
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A counterargument to this slogan will become a focal point of Chapters 4 and 5.
33 Utilitarianism, as an ethical theory, is not a decision procedure. In other words,
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require answers to epistemological questions, but ethical theories only provide criteria for
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should take care not to muddle those concepts.
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greater overall utility. As a result, these companies run according to a utilitarian or at
least proto-utilitarian program. Recall that this entails pure consequentialism, monism
about non-instrumental value, adherence to maximizing theory, and impartiality; though,
fittingly enough, the one fully redeemable feature of utilitarianism—impartiality—is
arguably omitted in the business variety of the theory. As we covered in Chapter 2.5, the
other three features of utilitarianism do not mesh with proper ethics. Thus, when we talk
about normative ethics, we cannot possibly mean something directly compatible with the
utilitarian system used by businesses. Among other things, normative ethics cannot be
purely consequentialist, must be pluralist with respect to non-instrumental value, and
should not unexceptionally conform to maximizing theory. Accordingly, when we try to
introduce normative ethics into the world of business, we run into conflict. How can we
reconcile non-consequentialism and respect for persons as persons with the pure
consequentialism that drives the commercial system? How can we ask a business that
believes its mission to be the maximization of profit to instead conform to satisficing
theory? How do you convince monists with respect to the non-instrumental value of
utility of the intrinsic value in a plurality of virtues? All of these paradoxes, and more,
plague the unification of business and ethical theory. This also explains how a collective
of people who are normally empathetic and in compliance with ethical obligations could
form a company that violates the privacy of private citizens.

The program that

underwrites their business’s behavior is purely consequentialist and has no conception of
respect for persons as ends and never as mere means, so the ramifications of that nonconsequentialist, Kantian feature are never entertained.
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The Slow Arm of the Law
What is ethically right and what is legally permitted do not always converge, and
even in instances when they do, it often takes years, decades, or centuries for our laws to
catch up to our collective moral conscience. In the same vein, our infrastructure, whether
it is cyber or industrial, also tends to lag behind innovation, only adopting new rules and
systems after the old ones have become entirely obsolete. In our specific case of Big
Data and privacy violation, this short, slow arm of the law combined with the reactive
nature of infrastructure design has an adverse effect on the moral behavior of businesses.
In the legal sphere it becomes the case that “many instances of unethical
behaviour are not illegal: ethics goes beyond the law. Other cases are difficult to prove,
and the imperfections in the justice system are a real handicap in encouraging business
ethics”.34 Further, our justice system does not always speak utilitarian. By this I mean, to
get a utilitarian to disavow an act, one must make the negative consequences of that act
stiff enough that performing it would no longer maximize utility. However, the U.S.
legal system, even when it does prescribe a punishment for a business’s unethical
behavior, often presupposes that businesses who violate the law will experience a sort of
Kantian revelation and recognize the error of their ways as a result of nonconsequentialist thinking. Due to the almost dogmatic praise we heap on proprietors and
entrepreneurs, U.S. legislators are hesitant to saddle businesses with any regulations or
restrictions that might deter future unethical acts.

Consequently, the judiciary is

hamstrung, unable to mete out the sort of punishments that interface well with the
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implicit assumptions of utiliatrians. For instance, records vary in respect to the number
of bankers who were imprisoned for their role in the 2008 financial crisis, but we do
know that only one top Wall Street banker was sentenced to jail time and the percentage
of white collar crime prosecuted by the federal government immediately after the crash
actually shrunk from where it had been in the mid-90’s.35 This meager punishment is not
likely to discourage similar future behavior from utilitarian actors, yet it is a feature of
our legal system.
Meanwhile, unaddressed flaws continue to plague the world of cyber security,
“the many sources for retrieving and generating data have expanded the amount and
availability of personal data. For example, health data is particularly vulnerable; a single
breach risks exposing critical information from a multitude of patients’ records”.36 This
means, in addition to the weak or non-existent punishment for their behavior, businesses
know that obtaining valuable information is incredibly easy because the cyber
infrastructure rules and regulations have not kept pace with the ability of would-be
thieves. Again, the system meant to mitigate unethical behavior actually encourages it
because of its utilitarian illiteracy.

Normalized Corruption
On a more sociological level, we can see that corruption is hereditary—one
generation of corrupt practices can easily bleed into the next. For example, if a college
35
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football team’s seniors haze the freshmen every year by forcing them to make a lap
around the campus naked, it is likely that when any particular group of freshmen become
seniors they will continue the tradition. If you asked the seniors to answer as individuals
(that is, unaffiliated with the team) whether the tradition was ethically right, you would
probably find a majority who say it is not. But what if you asked them to answer with
team affiliation in mind? They might justify the hazing by claiming it is an initiation
ritual that builds trust and fosters brotherhood, and we can forgive them for that because
we all become susceptible to a certain amount of rationalized bullshit when we realize
we’ve done something immoral. The point here is not that football players are bad
people, but that people who would individually renounce unethical treatment can quickly
become apologists for it when put in a collective. Once-unacceptable behavior becomes
accepted as a norm. In the business world:
Corrupt behavior initiated by a few members of a group or collectivity
may transform over time into a collective norm. As corrupt behavior
spreads and intensifies within a community, individual deviance turns into
‘institutionalized corruption: personal behaviors become impersonal
norms, emergent practices become tacit understandings and idiosyncratic
acts become shared procedures’.37
Therefore, the normalization of corrupt behavior (likely embedded in most data-mining
companies already) also reinforces the notion that the harm of violating privacy rights
can be rationalized away using a purely consequentialist perspective. Since we know
businesses are already apt to think in consequentialist terms, it should come as no
surprise that they frequently normalize corruption per consequentialist argumentation.
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Furthermore, far from only trickling from the top down inside a business,
corruption can seep in from outside depending on the actions of competitors.

In

contemporary America where businesses must turn profits in order to remain afloat, one
cheating, unscrupulous company could become the justification for other companies
deciding to take their own shortcuts. For instance, “if a supplier is not paid on time, he in
turn is unable to pay his own suppliers. In some extreme cases, the only defence measure
is to refuse to deliver…a rather unethical practice, and in some cases approaching
blackmail. Thus, unethical behaviour encourages and breeds other unethical practices in
business”.38 After all, considering the structure of the system, if one business is cheating
to get ahead, it would be disadvantageous for the others not to engage in the same
behavior, since businesses judge ethics in consequentialist terms and not engaging would
threaten their continued existence, which has negative consequences for employees and
consumers. What we are left with is a perfect circle of literal backbiters39, each losing
mass to the man behind him while recovering it from the man in front with no one daring
to object, lest they be eaten whole.

Conclusion
In summation, because we fail to speak to businesses in utilitarian terms, and
instead expect them to meet us with better ethical theories in mind, we are incapable of
creating conditions that encourage behavior more consistent with normative ethics. Until
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we do start communicating with businesses in their own ethical language, we as private
citizens in a capitalist country should expect they will continue engaging in unethical
practices in order to gain private information that may benefit them. Remember, even if
a company contains a quorum of ‘good’ people, it cannot allow normative ethics to play a
decisive role in its decision-making because it may run counter to the ultimate goal.
Just to reiterate, this is not an attempt to make an excuse for the invasion of
privacy or contend that businesses are mere helpless actors in a causal cycle that requires
them to violate our privacy. Instead, this section is meant to paint the institutional
structure as partially responsible for enabling the kind of unethical behavior we might
find so despicable.

Case Study
Thus far, I have written about the difficulty in joining business utilitarianism and
normative ethics in the macroscopic abstract, but it might be helpful to investigate a realworld example of what I mean when I talk about these subjects. To that end, let’s study
the famous GM vs. Nader case of privacy invasion for examples of the institutionalized
incentives for corruption we have already posited.

GM vs. Ralph Nader
The Facts:
After Unsafe at Any Speed painted them in a negative light, General Motors took
to tapping Ralph Nader’s phone line in order to catch him saying or doing something
immoral in order to discredit his damning discoveries. When that failed to produce
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anything noteworthy, they hired prostitutes to proposition him in a supermarket (if
successful, the plan was to blackmail Nader with the evidence), though this scheme also
flopped.40 Afterward, Nader sued GM for invasion of privacy and won $425,000, a
backbreaking .02% of GM’s $2,125.6 million of profits from the 1966 fiscal year.
Analysis:
In this case, the motivation is clear. GM’s profits were threatened by Nader’s
book, and the simplest way to avoid a drop in revenue was to discredit Nader, thus
discrediting his attack on their brand. Much as Mandeville suggested, GM’s did not
comply with normative ethics due to their desire to maximize profit. Had they let Nader
go unchallenged and opted to take the normatively ethical route (as far as they knew)
their profits would fall, which, as we have already established, is a death sentence in a
capitalist economic system, and runs counter to the utilitarian engine of commercial
enterprise. Further, this case also elucidates the ineffectuality of the law. .02% of annual
profits is not a stiff enough penalty to deter a pure consequentialist whose ethical theory
does not include a notion of respecting persons as persons such that one man’s misery
(Nader in this case) appears justifiable insofar as it allows for the continued generation of
wealth that spreads about and trickles down to the nation at large.
As for our third institutional defect, normalization of this kind of corrupt,
unethical behavior is notoriously difficult to quantify, but the fact that GM President
James Roche apologized personally to Nader before a Senate subcommittee suggests this
scandal went all the way to the top and infected the entire company. This again shows
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that the ethical theory at the heart of GM did not include a requirement for treating
persons as ends in themselves and never as mere means.
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Chapter 4: How to Win Games and Extort People

Why Data Collection?41
As the companies and government agencies reading this paper probably recall, in
Chapter 2, I presented empirical evidence to prove the existence of mass data collection
directed at ordinary, American citizens, and in Chapter 3, I explained how attempts to
reconcile normative ethics with commercial utilitarianism inevitably fail, meaning
businesses (as a collective of people) do not feel the intuitive ethical aversion to privacy
violation in the same way individuals might. But even if companies have real incentives
to snoop, even if they can justify it as ethically right, it remains unexplained why the first
institution decided to cross the metaphorical Rubicon into the world of data collection.
After all, utilitarianism is not a decision procedure. Even if, under certain circumstances,
it condones privacy invasion as morally good, it cannot offer anything more than a
defeasible reason to actually invade privacy. In other words, the decision exists in a
different domain than the semantic categorization, as does the actual implementation
process. So while an ethical theory can give criteria for what counts as right and wrong,
it is still only a suggestion for action. A complete narrative requires an explanatory
account that tells a reasonable story about how (at least in principle) a company could
employ decision theory and move from standing against data collection42 to eventually
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blackmailing private citizens. In this case, ironically enough, it is our most celebrated
blessing that makes us susceptible to such awful vice. Man so often looks down on
instinctual beasts and counts himself superior because of his capacity for rationality, yet it
is that very gift that becomes his undoing.
Using simple game theory we can create a four-quadrant chart to illustrate how a
company that originally decided against implementing privacy invading policies could
fall victim to the Siren song of mass data collection and storage, all while acting
‘rationally’. Suppose two companies, Alpha and Beta, are considering collecting data on
consumers for the purpose of streamlining their operations. Alpha accepts that, in an
ideal scenario, collection would increase utility, but thinks the implementation is
impractical and finds other non-ethical43 reasons for avoiding the practice. For example,
while an obligation to treat customers as ends may not factor into Alpha’s ethical
considerations of what counts as right and wrong, it could still be a reason against making
the decision to engage in data collection irrespective of its exclusion from utilitarianism.
On the other hand, Beta not only accepts that collecting and storing data will make them
more efficient and maximize their profits, they believe implementation is feasible and
ignore or don’t assess the same weight to the non-ethical reasons that informed Alpha’s
decision. Thus, Beta intends to begin collecting data on consumers.
In Figure 1 below, Alpha’s actions are labeled beside the rows and when they
intersect with Beta’s actions (labeled atop the columns) the payout is listed in the form ‘A
and B’, meaning the first number represents Alpha’s payout and the second represents
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Beta’s. The numbers are representative of the value each company assigns to that
particular outcome.

Beta
Alpha

Collect Data

Don’t Collect

Collect Data

100 and 100

100 and 10

Don’t Collect

10 and 100

20 and 20

(Figure 1)

Assuming Alpha chooses ‘Don’t Collect’ and Beta chooses ‘Collect Data’, we get
a payout of 10 and 100, meaning Alpha gets 10 and Beta gets 100. Thus, Beta’s
malfeasance begets success while Alpha’s integrity becomes a disability and its
forethought a flaw. Post-decision, we have two companies playing the same game by
very different sets of rules—Beta has the liberty to ignore the plight of others, that great
American freedom: indifference; meanwhile, Alpha is encumbered by its commitment to
consumers. In return for their thoughtfulness, consumers punish Alpha by flocking to
Beta en masse. Now, the people at Alpha may still feel good about their decision not to
collect data, but remember the goal of a business is not to generate good feelings, but
rather a profit. If Mandeville’s story is to be believed, Alpha is making a mistake. In
fact, now that Beta is turning an even greater profit and expanding into previously
uncharted markets, Alpha will be forced to either collect data and stay in business or
remain true to its original decision until it is eventually swallowed by competitors. A
rational agent asked to choose a side in the Alpha-Beta problem has no real choice at all.
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Examining the scenario, the rational agent would always choose ‘Collect Data’ because
no matter what the other player does, it is always in a player’s best interest to collect.
Thus, the company more in line with normative ethics is either snuffed out or forced to
become the very thing it once found so distasteful.
However, suppose a different, though perfectly reasonable scenario, in which both
Alpha and Beta have a natural aversion to mass data collection, and thus, even though
they both know they would be better off collecting and storing data, and both believe it is
ethically justified, neither does. In fact, companies Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon also enter
Alpha and Beta’s market and none of them want to participate in the seedy game of data
collection either. It is particularly troubling to find that the addition of just one rogue
actor, Zeta, who has no reservation about collecting and storing data on private citizens
will infect the rest of the once ethically stalwart group. If we redraw Figure 1 with Zeta
now sitting atop the columns, we find that Alpha is in the exact same position as before
even though it now has four other allies who agree with it about the indecency of data
collection.

Zeta
Alpha

Collect Data

Don’t Collect

Collect Data

100 and 100

100 and 10

Don’t Collect

10 and 100

20 and 20

(Figure 2)
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Once again, Alpha is either forced to assent to mass data collection or face
eventual destruction at the hands of Zeta and other companies who choose to use data
collection to their advantage. The introduction of Zeta, like a single drop of red dye into
a cup of crystal clear water, changes the entire dynamic of the industry. The assumptions
from Chapter 3 combined with the payoffs in our figures demonstrate how even a
collective of moral, upstanding people could be corrupted by circumstance into behaving
in a way contrary to their own individual beliefs.

Blackmail
In this section, we will make the leap from data collection to blackmail. To that
end, I want to give a brief explanation of what I mean when using terms like ‘blackmail’
or ‘blackmail campaign’. The phrase ‘Blackmail campaign’ could refer to a company
using all information at its disposal to actively extort (through forced purchases or
donations) any consumer they felt would rather give up X dollars than have something
unsavory released to the public; though, as we will discuss later, this method may not be
the most effective. It could also refer to a more indirect method. For instance, a
company with dirt on 218 members of the United States House of Representatives, 60
members of the U.S. Senate, and the lone U.S. President could, in theory, influence
legislation and increase their profits as a result. For my purposes, I do not want to rule
out any of these possibilities, but I do think the most likely scenario involves the specter
of blackmail alone causing changes in people’s behavior. That is to say, if Joe Smith
knows that he has something in his past he would rather keep hidden, and he knows that
company X has been collecting data on him and likely knows about his secret, and he has
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seen how people who oppose company X frequently have their secrets revealed to much
personal and professional harm, then he may be more inclined to purchase products from
company X or use company X’s browsing service, etc. In a sense, given what we now
know about data collection, a company only needs to make credible their threat to
blackmail in order to prompt this sort of thought process in the mind of someone like Joe
Smith. But before we get too deep into this thought, I want to reinforce why a company
might resort to blackmail in the first place.
The explanation for blackmail takes essentially the same form as our explanation
for data collection. If, in our figures, we replace ‘Collect Data’ and ‘Don’t Collect’ with
‘Blackmail’ and ‘Don’t Blackmail’, the same problem reoccurs. All it takes is one player
to choose ‘Blackmail’ to force the other players to confront the option of slowly going
out of business or engaging in a practice they would otherwise choose not to. This is not
to understate or make flippant the vast differences between the data collection case and
the blackmail case. For one thing, the model used in the case of data collection is meant
to be explanatory in regards to an event that has already happened while the blackmail
case is more predictive. Furthermore, I do not mean to insinuate that the choices in each
case are equivalent. I think it is uncontroversial to suggest that, in general, people find
blackmail more disturbing than data collection, and would therefore be less likely to
engage in it simply to make a profit even if their moral calculus determined it to be
morally right. The trouble is, it takes only one rogue actor to initiate the sequence but
generations of ethical stewards to prevent it. The fact that megalomania and corruption
often find homes in the offices of the people charged with facing these payoff models
only exacerbates the problem.
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Even so, there is yet another facet to the blackmail case that distinguishes it from
the data collection case, and makes it more difficult to carry out effectively—you.
Although most people have technically given up the rights to much of their data by
clicking ‘Agree’ buttons under licensing agreements they have read little to none of and
thus had some say in whether or not mass data collection takes place, it is hard to imagine
how blackmail could be carried out in such a clandestine and almost trivial way.
Therefore, it is worth examining the plausibility of a company lucratively running a
blackmail campaign given the additional variables and barriers to success.
First and foremost, blackmail “want[s] to influence ‘rational decision’: choices
among alternative actions, insofar as the choices are determined by subjective expectation
and preference”.44 That is to say, blackmail attempts to make you choose a path that
would otherwise be considered irrational by altering your expectation through a threat. In
his work on blackmail, Daniel Ellsberg uses a version of the following chart to help
visualize the choice faced by the extorted.45 I have added an X in the Punish/Comply
quadrant because it would never be in a company’s interest to punish compliance:

Comply

Resist

Accept

90

100

Punish

X

0

(Figure 3)
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Note that although Figure 3 looks similar to Figures 1 and 2, it does not include the
payoffs for the blackmailer, meaning this is not meant to make the optimal choice for
each actor definitive, but to codify what is going through the head of the person being
blackmailed when they are confronted by the blackmailer.
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This figure gives only the payouts of the person being blackmailed. As we can
see, under normal circumstances, our subject would assign a weight of 90 (taking into
account whatever relevant criteria he sees fit) to complying with the blackmailer’s
request and a weight of 100 to resisting the request. Thus, under normal conditions,
resisting would be the natural, rational choice. The goal of blackmail is to alter that
choice. In this example, our subject may be tempted to comply based on the fear of
getting an outcome he assigns a weight of 0 should he choose to resist.

If he were

certain the blackmailer would punish if he resisted, it would no longer be rational to resist
because he would effectively be choosing 0 over 90. However, interpreting interactions
with others, we are rarely in positions of absolute certainty. Thus, the blackmailer must
determine the subject’s critical risk or “the maximum risk of punishment that you will
accept, in choosing to resist”.46 For example, if our subject resists with a perceived 10%
chance of punishment, but complies with a 50% perceived chance of punishment, then
his corresponding critical risk is somewhere between 10 and 50%. As the blackmailer,
all one must do is make certain the person being blackmailed perceives the threat to be
more likely than his or her critical risk.
For example, in an episode of the comedy web series Jake and Amir, Amir
attempts to use blackmail to force Jake to give him $1,875 for a ‘Blow your own Glass’
studio he purchased on eBay. The exchange goes like this:
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Amir: Alright, how 'bout this. You give me the 1875 or I blackmail ya.
Jake: With what?
Amir: With what? Isn't blackmail alone bad enough? Now you want to know "with
what"? How about I punch ya, man. Or you wanna know "with what"?47
In this case, we see that Amir has failed to establish any credibility. Jake assesses the
likelihood of Amir choosing ‘Punish’ to be 0, and is therefore empowered to choose
‘Resist’ in order to attain his best possible outcome. This scenario might be different if
Amir had a history of revealing damaging secrets about colleagues who resisted him or if
he presented to Jake a piece of information, the secrecy of which Jake determined to be
worth more than $1,875.
None of this is particularly hard to grasp theoretically, but in practice, all of these
procedures and percentages become mixed in with the minutiae of everyday life. This
places a rather large burden on the blackmailer to make his threat credible and to make
himself certain that the payouts offered are not so extreme that they undermine the
credibility of that threat.
There are several potential strategies a company could employ to increase the
likelihood of effective blackmail by increasing the credibility of their threats. One such
strategy would be a variation of the Tit-for-Tat strategy. In this scenario, any time an
actor resists, the company punishes and any time an actor complies, the company accepts.
In this way, over repeated interactions, those who comply receive a much higher payout
than those who resist, meaning the population ought to evolve to comply. However, this
is a dangerous strategy because of the other variables involved. Although, in principle,
47
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Tit-for-Tat ought to work, it runs the risk of producing too much bad publicity. If a
company exists in a world with ten other actors, and punishes nine of them while
accepting the one who complies, their reputation may suffer too much, which could force
them to stop their blackmail campaign.
company’s bottom line.

Similarly, it may be too harmful to the

Remember, neither the person being blackmailed nor the

blackmailer want the Resist-Punish outcome because, on the one hand, the citizen gets a
payout of zero, and on the other, the company expends resources for what is likely an
overall negative payout. The negative payout is only worthwhile insofar as it inspires
future compliance by increasing the credibility of threats. However, if this process is not
happening quickly enough or the resistance is too embedded, the company may not be
able to sustain the continued losses in repeated interactions.
Another strategy might involve giving an excessive punishment to a resister in
order to change the preferences of future players. In America for instance, there are
many people who espouse the idea that taxation is theft. If they truly believe that, then it
ought to be near impossible for the IRS to collect taxes from them. However, in many
cases these people allow themselves (from their perspective) to be robbed by the internal
revenue service. This may have something to do with the notoriously harsh punishments
given to those who have previously resisted the IRS.

In the case of commercial

enterprise acting against private citizens, the company engaging in blackmail may only
need to severely punish a few people before even those who are repulsed at the idea of
being extorted find it preferable to the ugly outcomes they have seen before. Again the
biggest drawback here would likely be the negative press. Though IRS punishments may
be harsh, they are legally ratified, and the IRS is generally accepted throughout the
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country as a legitimate and necessary institution. This same argument may not hold up
for a company like Google if they begin releasing horrible dirt on people who resist their
attempts at blackmail since they lack that sort of institutional prestige.
What might be more effective then would be a type of finesse blackmailing. That
is to say, the company that intends to engage in blackmail cultivates good relationships
with members of the media, acquires a good reputation through positive public relations,
and makes the first targets of the blackmail campaign people who they can so thoroughly
discredit that any pushback will be seen as the graceless flailing of a man on a sinking
ship. Further, given the current precision of data algorithms and the rapidly increasing
capability of technology, it would not be outrageous to assume, in the not so distance
future, a company could use an algorithm to predict what sort of people would be more
amenable to blackmail. This adds another wrinkle to finesse blackmailing.
The conditions of this tactic are not easily represented in a four-quadrant model,
but the scenario seems plausible enough. Suppose for the sake of argument that in the
morning paper you read of two murders that took place the night before, one allegedly
committed by Fred Rogers, one allegedly committed by Al Capone. Independent of the
facts of the cases, most people would likely require a greater amount of evidence to be
convinced of Mr. Rogers committing murder than they would for Al Capone. Later that
same day you turn on the television and hear countless stories from various media
members about Mr. Rogers’ philanthropy. News anchors across networks voice their
skepticism about the Rogers murder. On the other hand, no one on any network has
anything nice to say about Al Capone, and they almost treat his guilt as a foregone
conclusion. By cultivating relationships and a good reputation, Mr. Rogers has bought
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himself greater immunity from public reprisal than Al Capone. Likewise, our company
in question might be best served using finesse rather than pure power when beginning
their blackmail campaign.
Further, finesse blackmailing can be done in clandestine, almost trivial ways.
Imagine a phone company, Bell Phones, with 5 million customers nationwide. Bell
Phones has been collecting and storing data from their consumers’ phone calls for several
years and has a good reputation. Their current base price plan is three dollars cheaper
than competitor Marconi Phones who also has 5 million customers.

The natural

inclination of man to compare himself to his contemporaries has the executives at Bell
Phones feeling despondent because their swimming pools are thirty cubic feet smaller
than their counterparts at Marconi. To correct this injustice, the board decides to raise the
price of a Bell Phones’ base plan ten dollars. Basic economics suggests this should cause
an exodus of Bell Phones’ customers who will seek refuge in Marconi’s cheaper plan.
But remember, Bell Phones has been collecting and storing data on its customers this
whole time, and they make that fact well-known in some fashion or another. Most of
their customers decide the seven-dollar difference is a small price to pay for not having
their lives uprooted, so they begrudgingly renew their Bell Phones’ plans. If the plans
went from $10 to 20$ and Bell retained 4 million customers, they have increased their
profit by $30 million. This is no trivial sum, yet it results from a mere seven-dollar
increase that most consumers see as annoying but ultimately insignificant. That is the
nature of finesse blackmailing.
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Chapter 5: Objections to the Blackmail Outcome

I now want to examine some possible objections to the scenario I have just laid
out.

The first four objections will question the possibility of this nasty blackmail

campaign, while the final one will attempt to justify it using the utilitarian ethics we have
previously discussed.

Objection 1: The Desensitization Defense
Alfred Hitchcock’s film Psycho, released in 1960, stirred a good bit of
controversy in America for depicting an unmarried couple in bed together48 and lingering
in view of a flushing toilet.49 Yes, this was considered boundary stretching in Puritanical,
pre-hippy America, so why would we now laugh at the notion that either is taboo?
Desensitization.

People born in or after 1960, now the majority of the America’s

population, have never lived in a world where toilet-flushing and pre-marital coitus
hasn’t been depicted on the big screen. We have grown rather comfortable with these
ideas, so they no longer elicit shock, nor do they draw the ire of the Production Code
censors. Would not the same then happen with the information a company uses as
blackmail against a wide swath of the American people? Perhaps the first wave of people
whose kinks or fetishes are deemed revolting would suffer, but after some time, that type
of information would lose its potency. In essence the Desensitization Defense asks: If we
48
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discover, in virtue of release of once private information, that we really have more in
common than we first thought, might we actually be more prone to join in solidarity
against the blackmailing company thereby evading the problem altogether?
This objection does have some merit. After all, being outed as gay in America
used to mean, at best, social isolation, but now, as people have grown more accepting and
knowledgeable about homosexuality, coming out can be much less painful. However, it
would be strange to suggest this same logic applies to all secrets. For example, while
sexual preference may be something (and rightly so) that a person wants to release on his
own time,50 it is objectively harmless and ought not be treated with disdain. On the other
hand, something like sexual assault or murder is harmful and warrants revulsion and
punishment. Given that morality does not depend on the will of the majority, even
discovering that 51% of the American people had committed sexual assault would not
make the behavior acceptable. People with histories filled with these unquestionably
unacceptable behaviors would still make fine targets for blackmail, and their harsh
punishments for resisting could be enough to deter resistance from someone whose
‘crime’ (say a relatively normal fetish that they nonetheless think others find despicable)
is actually harmless.
This raises an additional counter objection—a company may not have to perform
too much actual punishment in order to deter most people from resisting. By that I mean,
four or five high profile cases of people suffering greatly after resisting attempts at
blackmail would probably make future actors less likely to resist. If this is the case, then
the material being released does not have a chance to become normalized because there is

50

More on this in Chapter 5.
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simply not enough of it in circulation to make a difference. Let us say, for sake of
argument, normalization of a once detested behavior occurs when we realize that roughly
one percent of the population engages in that behavior.

The current population of

America is approximately 319 million, which means it would take 3,190,000 individual
cases of the behavior in question to normalize it. If, after the promulgation of the first
100 cases of some behavior, Jim who has also engaged in that behavior notices his
cohorts are suffering as a result of being outed, he would be less likely to resist provided
complying did not require him to do something outrageous or overwhelming. As a result,
it seems unlikely that a company would ever need to release the 3 million odd cases
required to normalize the behavior. Even if we lower the threshold for normalization
drastically to something like 10,000 public cases, it remains at least plausible that people
would stop fighting back long before normalization occurred.

Objection 2: The Love of Freedom Defense
It is conceivable that people find the idea of blackmail so objectionable that, when
given the choice between complying and resisting extortion, their critical risks are raised
beyond normal levels because they value their freedom to make decisions above all else.
Thus, one might object that in a nation like America, proud and founded on the backs of
Protestant work ethic, a mass blackmail campaign is simply inexecutable.

On the

contrary, though, I have found people in general (a category which does include
Americans) to be quite willing to sacrifice freedom for convenience, and there is a
relevant analogy between those sacrifices and the blackmail case.
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For example, many children used to play the computer game Where in the World
is Carmen Sandiego? The object of the game was to use clues to pinpoint Carmen
Sandiego’s location on the world map. This game became infinitely easier when Carmen
Sandiego, like many people, decided to trade in her anonymity for the convenience of a
pocket-sized personal computer. If kids were to play the game today, they would only
need to open up their Find My iPhone app and use the GPS signal to locate Carmen. She
traded her ability to roam nations without detection for luxury. Now imagine if one of
the children playing the original game had taken Carmen’s family hostage and threatened
harm unless she revealed her location. In a sense, this is a similar tradeoff. The first
scenario uses a reward to get Carmen to give up her location and the second uses a threat,
but both, in effect, make Carmen reevaluate her priorities.

She would have to be

extremely indignant to put her freedom to travel unobserved above the safety of her
family.
This is echoed in the mass blackmail campaign. A breadwinner who is asked to
spend $100 monthly at Department Store X to prevent the release of damaging personal
information cannot simply weigh his desire for freedom against the unpleasantness of
blackmail. He must also consider the effect on his family, and any others who depend on
him. If asked to spend $100,000 a month at Department Store X, he may resist because
the price is simply too high, but the point here is, there is some cost requested by
Department Store X that we would expect the breadwinner to pay in spite of his personal
distaste for blackmail and love of freedom. This is simply to say, most people will accept
some minor drawbacks if it means maintaining the generally positive narrative arc of
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their life. Consider the bank robbery outlined by Pumpkin and Honey Bunny in the
opening of Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction:
Pumpkin: …You don't even need a gun in a federal bank. I heard of this one guy, walks
into a bank with a portable phone. He gives the phone to the teller, a bloke on the other
end of the line says, we've got this guy's little girl, if you don't give him all your money,
we're gonna kill her.
Honey Bunny: Did it work?
Pumpkin: Fucking right, it worked. That's what I'm talking about! Knucklehead walks
into a bank with a telephone. Not a pistol, not a shotgun, a fucking phone. Cleans the
place out, don't even lift a fucking finger.51
In this case, the man who hands the phone to the teller is actually in on the robbery and
there is no clear and present danger since he is unarmed. Nevertheless, the teller is
unwilling to step outside his usual routine or question the authenticity of the stick up. It
is just not worth it for the teller to make a martyr of himself here when complying, while
mildly unappealing, is not catastrophically bad or life-altering given that his compliance
ensures he will get to go home to his wife later and the bank will be compensated for the
loss of FDIC-insured money. This same reaction would likely occur in response to
finesse blackmailing.

Objection 3: The Eminem Defense
Consider a scenario where A, B, C, and D are all aware that Alpha has
compromising information on them, and for simplicity’s sake, let us assume the
information is relatively equal in badness, that is, nothing like murder, but also not just
some trivial secret that they wrongly believe is exclusive to them. One might expect that
A, B, C, and D would join together and release the information before Alpha can
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blackmail them; thus, removing the power of extortion. If they make up a society all
their own, then there will be no heavy negative repercussions because all the equally bad
secrets will be in the open. Further, they will effectively defang Alpha. I refer to this as
the Eminem defense in reference to his character, B-Rabbit, who in the movie 8 Mile is
involved in a rap battle with fellow rapper Papa Doc. Going into the battle, “Rabbit is
aware that Doc knows all his weak points, so he decides to address them preemptively
with his freestyle”.52 Papa Doc is forced to forfeit the match because B-Rabbit’s rap
acknowledges all the ‘embarrassing/compromising’ information that Doc had on Rabbit;
thus nullifying that information’s power. In our scenario, A, B, C, and D would be acting
similarly. Knowing that Alpha has access to all their secrets, they release them and
destroy their status as ‘secret’ altogether.
First, I would like to rebut by demonstrating that, even in a situation where the
blackmailing institution foolishly sets up a game of Prisoner’s Mild Delight (a game
where cooperation always appears to be the best outcome), there is some value e that
cooperators receive when dealing with defectors such that defection is actually more
rewarding than cooperation. This can be seen in Brian Skyrms’ model below where row’s
payouts are shown when played against column’s actions.

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperator

2+e

e

Defector

2

0

(Figure 4)
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As Skyrms explains, if “1 defector is introduced into a population of N cooperators…
cooperators pair with the defector with probability (1/N) and with other cooperators with
probability (N-1)/N, for an average payoff of [(N-1)/N]*2 + e. So if e < (2/N), a spiteful
mutant does better than the native cooperators”.53 In other words, if Alpha can ensure
that the value of e is greater than 2/N with N representing the cooperating population,
then we ought to expect defection to occur even in a Prisoner’s Mild Delight scenario
where defection ought to be most difficult to encourage. If defection does occur, then A,
B, C, and D’s strategy is defeated because they cannot simultaneously take away Alpha’s
power and ensure that everyone know everyone’s secrets (since the defectors will keep
their secrets hidden). In virtue of the fact that we ought to expect Alpha to set up
matrices far friendlier to their cause than Figure 4 in the first place, we should at least
assume in this worst case scenario they will do the bare minimum to ensure the success of
their blackmail and seek out a value of e that nullifies A, B, C, and D’s strategy. If we
can assume that, so can A, B, C, and D, and this will likely make them too wary and
suspicious of each other to even attempt their plan.
We might also object that we cannot realistically extrapolate from the population
size in the Eminem Defense to the entirety of America. For instance, in a population of
four like we see with A, B, C, and D, coordination of release is much simpler than it
would be with a larger group.

Additionally, since the Eminem Defense posits the

existence of only four actors, we can safely assume that A, B, C, and D know each other
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quite well and each trusts that the others will keep their word and release their secrets.
However, in the real-world case of this objection, a 30-year-old man who has never left
Philadelphia would have to put his trust in a seventy-seven year old woman from outside
Topeka, which may require more faith in others than the average person possesses. As a
result, in a population as large as the United States, it would be unlikely that the Eminem
Defense would be sufficient protection from blackmail.

Objection 4: The Inaccurate Results Defense
Some people argue that, although running algorithms through collected data can
produce reliable information about someone, it can also be mistaken, meaning we should
not view it as 100% reliable. Thus, all accusations made based on data-mining should
and will be treated with heavy skepticism, which will soften the harm done to even those
truly guilty of what the algorithm claims.
To refute this, I imagine something like a modern day false rape allegation. Of
course, based on our justice system, someone accused of rape ought to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty. Further, about 2-3% of rape allegations are false, which is
around the same percentage of people who could be falsely classified based on a
reasonably good algorithm used for data-mining. However, we do not often see those
accused of rape treated as innocent, ordinary citizens until a jury judges them guilty.
These people, emphasizing the innocent accused, often have their lives torn to pieces
before a verdict is rendered, and oftentimes they cannot even recover much of what they
have lost based on stigma and privately held doubts about their actual guilt. I do not see
why we should expect people to be more forgiving or discerning when it comes to the
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world of digitally mined data about someone. If anything, the fact that this digitally
mined data is mathematically backed instead of delivered straight from a flawed human’s
mouth ought to make people even less skeptical about its accuracy. Simply put, the
possibility of false positives has never been enough to spur restraint or reflection of harsh
allegations in the past, and we should not use it to defend the notion of surveillance and
privacy invasion.
Moreover, if the proposed crime is sufficient enough to make the public
irrationally rabid, it might even be in a company’s interest to intentionally lie about what
their algorithms’ reported to impugn someone’s character provided the evidence
surrounding the lie is murky enough to prevent full refutation. After all, in the public
eye, the burden of proof often falls on the accused, and a shrewd enough company could
use this societal weakness to their advantage.

Objection 5: The Milo Minderbinder Defense54
Many people in America find no fault in defending actions that run counter to
normative ethics so long as they are profitable, just ask a majority of the U.S. Congress or
my father.

These defenses, given their most charitable readings, are essentially

restatements of the utilitarian claims from Chapter 3. The thought here is that, from a
purely consequentialist standpoint, more people benefit from blackmail than are harmed
by it since the blackmail we’re thinking about encourages spending, which puts more
capital into circulation and is ultimately almost universally advantageous because utility
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While the first four objections all cite reasons to doubt the emergence of the blackmail
outcome, the fifth objection actually justifies the blackmailing with a normative claim
that blackmail leads to a better overall outcome than no blackmail.
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increases in a booming economy. Thus, proponents contend that even though blackmail
is undesirable, the fact that it efficiently generates wealth is enough to ethically justify it
at the expense of a small subset of the population.55
Milo Minderbinder famously uses this argument in Joseph Heller’s Catch-2256 to
defend his actions after his underground business is found to have contracted missions
with and provided intelligence to the enemy German army, leading to the deadly
bombing raid on the American soldiers at Pianosa. When Minderbinder finds out he will
be tried for treason he hires “an expensive lawyer who is able to convince the court that it
was capitalism which made America great.” 57 He “is absolved…by disclosing his
enormous profit to the investigating congressional committee”.58 Even though Milo sold
out his own unit, he claims that everyone has a share in his syndicate; thus, his success is
everyone’s success. As a result, his profit is reason enough to pardon his apparent
treason. This is mirrored in the potential reply to the blackmail case where the immoral
act, evaluated as such by normative ethics, is excused because of the overall economic
benefit. In fact, “Heller created Minderbinder's famous saying ‘What's good for Milo
Minderbinder, is good for the country’ as a parody of Charles E. Wilson, who said ‘What
is good for General Motors is good for the country’ during a hearing of a Senate
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subcommittee in 1952”.59 One could imagine a modern day Charles E. Wilson saying
something similar if his company were caught blackmailing individuals in order to turn
higher profits.
To defeat the Minderbinder defense we must demonstrate that the harm of
blackmail extends beyond just the person being blackmailed. If we can prove damage is
done to people simply because they live in a world where mass blackmail and spying is
happening, the Minderbinder defense fails since it is no longer utility maximizing.
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Chapter 6: Caroline and the Average Man

Against the Minderbinder Defense: A Theory of how Espionage Threatens
Personhood
If the public writ large were jurors adjudicating the right to and proper extent of
privacy, it would not be difficult to come up with non-controversial cases where they
would consistently uphold the right to confidentiality. This class of cases would include
things like potentially embarrassing or life-altering secrets60 and behavior that would not
be seen as normal or healthy in a public forum due to stigma, but that one engages in
while in private.61
We’re predisposed to think this type of material is not the proper business of the
community because:
1.) We all possess some material that fits this category and we don’t want it released.
2.) There’s little doubt that its unauthorized release could harm the subject.
For example, revealing a sexual fetish or preference might make someone the object of
ridicule or even psycho-religious controversy in certain areas of the world. In the ‘80’s
and ‘90’s, being outed as an AIDS patient could turn someone into a social pariah. The
release of a person’s net worth could cause said person to become the target of robbers or
gold-digging significant others, while revealing their debt could alienate them from
potential partners. Thus, most of us would agree these secrets are best revealed at the
discretion of their owners. However, these examples do not make the strongest case for
the inherent harm in privacy invasion because they are all reliant on some ‘out of the
60
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ordinary’ quality of the subject. To answer the Minderbinder defense, we need to prove
that privacy invasion is harmful even when nothing out of the ordinary is gathered in the
observation.
Suppose for a moment the existence of an ‘Average Man’ who quite literally
embodies all the qualities we attribute to normal62 people. That is to say, this man has an
unremarkable amount of money, but enough to get by, such that releasing his financial
information would cause about as much drama as a fly in a mosh pit. He enjoys nothing
but the most vanilla sex and only for the purpose of procreation. His medical history is
completely clean aside from perhaps an appendectomy or tonsillectomy, but nothing that
would reasonably affect his ability to be insured or form relationships. In his free time,
he sits quietly in a chair and reads great literature of the 19th and 20th centuries. To defeat
the Minderbinder defense, we need to prove that even for this ‘Average Man’, an
invasion of privacy constitutes harm, and rather significant harm at that. In fact, I want to
go a step further and suggest that even if the ‘Average Man’ is never blackmailed, even if
the blackmail campaign stimulates the economy and gives him lifelong financial security,
even if his behaviors and thoughts become better63 because he wants to avoid being a
target of blackmail, even then he is harmed.
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Whether or not ‘normal’ people properly exist is irrelevant. This ‘Average Man’ is
simply the manifestation of traits we associated with normalcy. For instance, even if
everyone picks their nose, which would in fact make nose-picking normal, the fact that
we might associate not picking one’s nose with being properly normal means this
‘Average Man’ would not be a nose picker.
63
I am suggesting here that his awareness of intruders makes the ‘Average Man’ act in
total accordance with normative ethics. True enough, the ‘Average Man’ may already be
acting in accordance with these claims in virtue of how I have described him, but this
same example could work for the ‘Nearly Average Man’ whose only fault, prior to the
blackmail campaign, is his slight deviance from normative ethics.
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However, before we can levy any claims about harms against persons, average or
not, we must get clear on what exactly a ‘person’ is. Colloquially, we often equate
personhood with life i.e. life begins at conception, life begins at birth, life began billions
of years ago and is a complex, continuous process, but this line of thought is not
philosophically helpful. Surely the ‘life’ being posited here is more than having the right
configuration of atoms and being a member of the right species. If these were the only
qualifications, we would consider zombies to be persons and confer them all the same
rights we claim for ourselves. However, we intuitively resist this because personhood is
not so modestly defined. According to Charles Taylor:
Where it is more than simply a synonym for ‘human being’, ‘person’
figures primarily in moral and legal discourse. A person is a being with a
certain moral status, or a bearer of rights. But underlying the moral
status, as its condition, are certain capacities. A person is a being who has
a sense of self, has a notion of the future and the past, can hold values,
make choices; in short, can adopt life-plans. At least, a person must be the
kind of being who is in principle capable of all this, however damaged
these capacities may be in practice.64
Taylor’s account of personhood excludes things like zombies because they cannot
hold values or make choices. Perhaps, they are not even bearers of a token-reflexive “I”,
which distinguishes them from other members of their species.65 If scientists invented
some type of shock programming to control and influence a zombie’s every movement,
we could make a legitimate argument that the zombie would not be harmed because the
64
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ability to choose and hold values are not prerequisites for zombiehood. On the other
hand, a person, by definition must be able to hold values and make choices, so stripping
away those capacities could plausibly constitute harming that person because the
prevention of normative and cognitive development through outside interference is an
impediment to a good, flourishing life. Therefore, for privacy invasion to count as
harmful, it must remove or impede the ability of a person to meet the necessary
conditions of personhood. I will argue that certain kinds of privacy invasion limit
intimacy, thereby disturbing friendship and negatively impacting normative development,
which hinders ones’ development as a person and, thus, constitutes a serious harm.
Now one might naturally and preemptively want to object to the very existence of
privacy. If humans are social animals, speaking public languages, living in a global
world, and reliant on each other to survive, then is ‘privacy’ not just a vacuous term kept
alive by a syndicate of misguided Libertarians? If by privacy, we mean the ability to
completely isolate oneself from other human beings and institutions, perhaps privacy has
become a myth, or at least uncommon enough to make us doubt its existence. However,
this is not the account of privacy I want to use. Rather, I think a good account of privacy
ought to be as applicable to a lone person lying in bed as it is to four close friends sharing
a drink in the kitchen. According to James Rachels66:
Even in the most common and unremarkable circumstances, we regulate
our behavior according to the kinds of relationships we have with the
people around us. If we cannot control who has access to us, sometimes
including and sometimes excluding various people, then we cannot
control the patterns of behavior we need to adopt (this is one reason why
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privacy is an aspect of liberty) or the kinds of relations with other people
that we will have.67
Rachels account implies that even on a city street, two friends walking side by side
should expect some degree of privacy. Since privacy is our ability to control what kind
of information about ourselves we divulge, how we divulge it, and when we do so, even
our friends on the busy street should see a violation in a stranger eavesdropping on their
conversation or a third person intervening to reveal a secret one friend was about to tell
the other, even if that secret was on the tip of the tongue.
So we now have a foundational definition of privacy that makes its existence
quite plausible. At this point, I will turn to Charles Fried to help develop the connection
between our new understanding of privacy and personhood. Fried has argued that:
[A] necessary feature of love and friendship is a ‘sharing of information
about one’s actions, beliefs, or emotions which one does not share with
all, and which one has the right not to share with anyone. By conferring
this right, privacy creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship
and love’.68
Fried’s work borrows assumptions from Rachels’ account of privacy, namely that privacy
consists in our ability to divulge or withhold information as we see fit. Fried goes one
step further though, and demonstrates that the intimacy privacy affords is a prerequisite
for friendship. Without intimacy, friendship loses its meaning, and without friendship,
one cannot appropriately express virtues related to being a friend, which hinders one’s
ability to meet Taylor’s definition of personhood.
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To clarify, let’s continue with Fried’s metaphor, which claims privacy creates
moral capital that can be spent on friendship and love. If our privacy is constantly
invaded, we may refuse to spend our moral capital because we feel uncomfortable
sharing secrets in the presence of those to whom we do not want them divulged. On a
long enough timeline, with enough intervention, this would lead to a loss of friendships
because people would stop ‘spending’ altogether. However, even if one overcame a
natural aversion to divulging privileged information in the presence of a stranger, one’s
moral capital would still depreciate because the once-personal information would
instantly become public knowledge. That is, information that is supposed to be indicative
of trust and companionship between two people is devalued when dispersed to
eavesdropping strangers. In other words, intimacy is annihilated by perpetual incursions.
Consider this, in an intimate situation, receiving personal information makes the
recipient special. He or she is privy to something that most other people are not. They
are trusted with access to a more complete picture of a person. However, if an intruder is
always present, this specialness fades away. Fried is essentially espousing the idea that if
everyone is special, no one is. Imagine if everyone had priority boarding on a plane. In
that case, there would effectively be no priority boarding.

Similarly, if a person’s

intimate secrets are available to anyone in earshot, the secrets are not really so intimate
after all. Therefore, even if one is able to somehow ignore intruders and engage in an
exchange of intimate information, that exchange is immediately devalued by the fact that
just anyone (in this case, the intruder) has access to it. Given that, the exchange actually
lacks intimacy, and being that our intimacy is what allows us to spend our moral capital
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to establish and sustain friendships, a lack of intimacy is directly correlated with a lack of
true friendships.
Stanley Benn makes a similar argument in his book A Theory of Freedom:
If Caroline knows that Alan is listening, his intrusion alters Caroline’s
consciousness of herself and of her experiences in relation to her world.
Formerly self-forgetful, she may now be conscious of her opinions as
candidates for Alan’s approval or contempt. But even without selfconsciousness of this kind, her immediate enterprise – her conversation
with Desmond – may be changed for her merely by Alan’s presence.69
In addition to reinforcing certain themes from Rachels’ and Fried’s work, Benn’s
argument here elucidates the way in which a third party’s presence can alter normative
development practices.70 That is to say, too much outside interference can harm our
cognitive relationship with the world. I’ll elaborate on this idea below.
I’m going to take for granted that removing personhood from a creature capable
of it is a serious harm to that creature. As we have already shown, personhood includes a
certain moral status and capacities like the ability to survey relevant facts and make
decisions. If something interferes with that status or those capacities, it consequently
hinders an agent’s ability to achieve personhood, which, again, is a serious harm. We can
justify this through a famous epistemological debate.
In what might be a worldwide first, Donald Trump is actually useful here. Trump
is on record stating, “The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese
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in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.”71 Those of us with the capacity
for rational, abstract thought know this is not the case, but just because our belief accords
with truth does not make that belief epistemologically good. For instance, imagine
Donald Trump calls a press conference and announces he now believes that climate
change is real and that humans have some part in accelerating its pace. We would
naturally ask:
‘What prompted you to change your mind?’
Trump might respond: ‘Well I have a very good mind, some are saying the best,
and it’s very good, and many smart people, the smartest, have been telling me that it’s
actually more economically beneficial to fund alternative energy—and by the way, no
one respects alternative energy more than me—so they’re saying it and we’re gonna do it.
We’re gonna fund alternative energy like you’ve never seen, big league, and climate
change is real by the way. It’s real and you have to say it’s real because we have to fund
alternative energy. We’re getting killed on alternative energy.’
In this case, his view now tracks reality, but he has arrived at his conclusion
through flawed logic and bad epistemic practice. But what if every time we found
something economically beneficial, we also found a tangentially related truth such that
someone led around by free market economics like a cow by a nose ring always wound
up espousing true beliefs even though they had no justification for those beliefs beyond
material, self-interest? In that example, our subject would still not reflect epistemic
excellence because, as seen through Gettier problems, knowledge is more than just
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justified, true belief. We need a more Zagzebskian72 notion of good epistemic practice;
e.g. justified, true belief that is good in other ways. For instance, relying on virtue
epistemology we might claim that virtuous epistemic practice73 does not reduce to the
veracity of the claims made as a result of the investigative process. That is to say,
intellectual irresponsibility (even so far as it produces views that reflect reality) cannot
accord with good epistemic practice.

After all, if we were merely after truth

maximization, we would be inclined to marvel at the epistemic progress made when
someone memorizes every number in the phone book, but we do not do this. There is a
necessary, normative component to doing epistemology well.
Similarly, in our case, the ‘Average Man’ who acquires good behaviors and
wealth as a result of the blackmail campaign will find those acquisitions are meaningless
because they do not reflect a good relationship with the world nor do they allow him to
grow and express his capacity for personhood by forming beliefs and making judgments
free from interference. Thus, our ‘Average Man’ may appear to be flourishing in the
world of the Minderbinder defense, but he is not because, despite looking like a success,
he has been stripped of his ability to make choices and hold his own values—features of
personhood that, when removed, constitute harm.
This is paralleled in Benn’s story about Caroline.

If our investigation into

epistemology is right, then even if Alan’s presence causes Caroline to change her beliefs
for the better because she is wary of his opinion, he is still committing harm by
preventing her from acquiring good, true beliefs in the appropriate manner. Caroline’s
72

Zagzebski, Linda. "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems." The Philosophical
Quarterly 44.174 (1994): 65-73. Web. 16 Oct. 2016.
73
That is, arriving at beliefs based on a preponderance of evidence that reflects a good
cognitive relationship with the world.
63

own cognitive relationship with the world suffers. When she filters her thoughts in order
to placate, impress, or avoid judgment from Alan, her normative development is stunted.
Stunting Caroline’s normative development effectively robs her of her ability to
flourish as a person. If she divulges all sorts of apparently personal information to
Desmond, but that information is actually only presented as her own because of Alan’s
presence, Caroline and Desmond’s ‘friendship’ is predicated on falsehoods and is no real
friendship at all. This disturbs both Caroline and Desmond’s pursuit of the good life
because false friendships (or a total lack of friendships) prevent one from learning what
values related to friendship are appropriate to hold and how they are appropriately
expressed. If Caroline has no friends, she has no way to express her concern for the wellbeing of a friend. This expression of virtue is something we ought to expect from a
person, and its exclusion renders one less developed than they could have otherwise been.
Benn notes this worry when he continues:
Personal relations are exploratory and creative; they flourish with care and
attention, requiring continuous adjustment as the personalities of the
parties are modified by experience, both of one another and of the
relationship’s environment. Such relations could not exist without
conditions that excluded intruders.74
This is consistent with our prior conclusion. Intrusions stunt friendships like malnutrition
stunts growth, and a loss of friendships prevents the kind of care and attention Benn
writes about, which in turn, prevents the appropriate expression of that care and attention
that is a prerequisite for a flourishing life.
Substituting an omnipresent eye in for Benn’s character of Alan might get more to
the heart of the privacy invasions we face in the 21st century. As stated in earlier

74

Benn. 284.
64

sections, almost everything we do leaves a trail of data that someone could conceivably
track. As we become more aware of something (in this case the all-seeing eye) actually
doing the tracking, we will inevitably alter our beliefs and actions. Per the arguments of
the last few pages, when privacy is violated in this way, people suffer.
For a final diagnosis of the flaw in the Minderbinder defense, let’s return to
Charles Taylor. According to his definition, persons are more than simple, instinctual
creatures or littered newsprint that moves only as the wind directs it. They are special
precisely because they can recognize when they are confronted with a choice, survey and
weigh relevant criteria, and decide what ought to be done. This process necessarily
contains normativity.

To ‘do’, a person must first believe and desire.

His action

presupposes a type of intentionality. Even more than this, his beliefs and expressions
ought to reflect good cognitive development and a good relationship with the world.
That is, people must create and hold their beliefs based on a process that respects others’
moral status and reflects epistemic responsibility. In some sense then, a surveillance
system that forces a person to always consider the approval or disapproval of the
observing party strips them of their personhood. The weight of the observer’s opinion (or
rather perceived opinion) becomes a major factor in the process of belief forming for the
subject. This inability to control his own normative vision of the world removes a staple
of personhood. I do not mean to claim that surveillance necessarily makes a subject a
non-person, just that it does strip away the freedom of a process necessarily present in
persons. In a sense, we could see this as a violation of Kant’s notion that persons are
ends in themselves. Putting someone under constant surveillance, alters their ability to
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make personal, normative judgments, which in turn, pushes them closer to the newsprint
in the wind, heavily influenced by outside factors.
Why do the companies using the Minderbinder defense to justify their actions
miss this point? For the same reason they struggle to incorporate normative ethics into
their worldview: a reliance on utilitarianism.

Our diagnosis shows the flaw in the

Minderbinder defense is that it fails to respect persons as ends in themselves and never as
mere means. However, commercial enterprises are blind to this flaw because their ethics
models also fail to account for Kantian respect for persons. Thus, the Minderbinder
defense arises due to an imperfection in the utilitarian account of ethics used by
businesses and is dissolved through a proper investigation of personhood and morality.
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Chapter 7: Life in the Panopticon

Since I have already defeated the Minderbinder defense even after giving it full
deference and charitable consideration, I feel free to assert that none of the positive
assumptions I granted it would actually come to fruition. In this section, I will offer an
alternative rebuttal by using Bentham and Foucault’s work on the Panopticon to claim
that the type of mass surveillance essential for a blackmail campaign necessarily creates a
kind of depressed, dystopian society, not one that appears to be flourishing, even if that
flourishing is based on a mistaken conception of the good life.
Observation affects reality. This is as true scientifically; e.g., electrons in the
double-slit experiment, as it is socially; e.g., junior varsity athletes when the coach turns
his back. But despite the enormity of difference between these two cases, one obvious
similarity remains: the observer’s presence is easy to ascertain. The quantum observer in
the double-slit experiment is either present or not. Likewise the coach is either facing the
players or has his back to them. However, for a true analogy to the conditions present in
modern surveillance, we ought to consider what happens when an observer’s presence is
not so binary. We can do this through a case I’ll inelegantly dub Schrödinger’s Dime.75
Let’s imagine three heterosexual men in a suite lounge, sitting around a table,
eating peanuts and pretzels, and generally being themselves.76 Further let’s accept that
these three men: Arthur, Brian, and Chris react differently when they encounter pretty
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women. Arthur only talks about ‘appropriate’ things—that is, he avoids topics he thinks
might gross girls out or make him appear overly feminine. Brian becomes a ‘peacock’,
constantly bragging about himself and trying to show off. Chris clams up and becomes
almost entirely mute. Additionally, because they consider it feng shui, they hang a thick,
black curtain to divide their suite lounge from the corridor leading into the hallway. One
day, Debra, a universally agreed upon gorgeous woman (both physically and personalitywise) comes over to borrow some Tupperware. While she is around, our three tenants
adjust their behavior accordingly. Eventually, Debra excuses herself and disappears
behind the curtain. If, in virtue of the curtain, they cannot see whether or not Debra has
actually left the room, how long will it be until Arthur, Brian, and Chris return to their
normal behaviors? Now obviously in this case if their fear of her presence persists, one
of them can check behind the curtain to see if she is still there. Nonetheless, the point
remains, after Debra vanishes behind the curtain none of them can be sure if they are or
aren’t in the presence of an attractive woman; thus, they will likely continue to behave in
abnormal ways just to be safe. These abnormal actions don’t appear to be good in any
justifiable respect. They don’t seem to be the staple building blocks of the sort of happy
society I granted the Minderbinder defense in the previous chapter.
The Schrödinger’s Dime account differs from my other explanations of behavior
modification because it gives a socio-psychological story for how life under surveillance
actually alters a person’s actions.

It is, in essence, a frivolous parody of Jeremy

Bentham’s Panopticon, here described by Michel Foucault:
The major effect of the Panopticon [is] to induce in the inmate a state of
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning
of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its
effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action…To achieve this, it is at
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once too much and too little that the prisoner should be constantly
observed by an inspector: too little, for what matters is that he knows
himself to be observed; too much, because he has no need in fact of being
so. In view of this, Bentham laid down the principle that power should be
visible and unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before
his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon.
Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at
any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so.77
In Foucault’s story, the Panopticon harms prisoners by suppressing their individual
personalities through the perpetual threat or appearance of observation.

The new

personalities that arise are not consistent with ‘good behavior’; no one in the Panopticon
finds himself a model citizen because of the gentle nudge of the guards’ eyes. Instead,
we see the development of paranoia and insanity. In our Schrödinger’s Dime account,
Arthur, Brian, and Chris are analogous to the prisoners; they lose their true, individual
personalities because their opinions and behaviors anticipate Debra’s presence. That is to
say, they filter their actions through Debra’s eyes and what her estimation of those
actions might be. Imagine our trio, trapped in the lounge suite, with no way to peel back
the curtain. In this case, the permanent threat of Debra’s presence78 would alter their
behavior and growth in much the same way the threat of a guard affects prisoners in the
Panopticon, and none of these altered behaviors align with what we would consider good.
Of course, most of us will likely never experience life in a literal Panopticon
prison, but Bentham’s original invention has taken on new meaning in the era of mass
surveillance and data collection. In a world where companies and agencies can collect,
store, and interpret the data we create nearly everywhere we go, a literal prison becomes
77

Foucault, Michel. "Discipline and Punish, Panopticism." In Discipline & Punish: The
Birth of the Prison, edited by Alan Sheridan, 195-228. New York: Vintage Books,
1977.
78 Remember, these effects occur even if Debra is never actually present in the suite. So
long as her presence is likely enough our trio can never relax their inauthentic behaviors.
69

almost redundant. We may not be relegated to physical cells, trapped behind bars, lit up
in the eye of a spotlight, uncertain of whether or not a guard is spying on us from his
central tower, but we are trapped a world where our data belies our behavior, actions, and
opinions, which are contained in our many technological toys, which the ‘guards’ (datacollecting institutions) can extract sensitive information from at any time.

This

metaphorical Panopticon functions much the same as Bentham’s literal prison would
have, but it maintains the illusion of freedom; prisoners are free to roam but not free from
constant observation.
To be fair, there is a relevant disanalogy between the metaphorical and literal
cases, one we all likely interact with every day—people who are either unaware or
dismissive of the power and potential danger of this Panoptic state. The Panopticon
cannot function if everyone is blissfully unaware of their status as ‘prisoners.’ However,
preliminary studies from the Pew Research Center suggest a troubling trend away from
happy ignorance. According to a 2015 survey conducted by Pew:
18% of Americans who are aware of the surveillance programs say they
have changed the way they use their email accounts ‘somewhat’ or ‘a
great deal’. 17% say they have changed the way they use search engines.
15% say they have changed the way they use their cell phones. 13% say
they have changed the way they use text messages. 9% say they have
changed the way they use their landline phones.79
Further, when asked why they modified their behavior, many respondents gave answers
like “‘I used to be more open to discussing my private life online with my select friends.
Now I don’t know who might be listening’ [and] ‘[I] can’t joke about stuff that could be
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taken as a threat’”. 80 These answers, particularly the first selection, ought to look
disturbingly similar to the worries raised by Rachels, Benn, and the like. Granted, the
effects are not as widespread as some philosophers have predicted, but rather than scrap
our theories we can attribute the dissimilarities to ignorance of surveillance programs or a
lack of tangible evidence that these programs target ordinary citizens and can lead to
significant pain and punishment.
Moving beyond raw survey data, investigative social science has also identified a
relationship between privacy invasion and a decline in both mental and physical health.
Researchers claim, when observing those living under surveillance, “personality change
has been noted in a number of studies and has been recognized by ICD-10. The most
prominent features of this include symptoms of apathy, chronic tiredness, lack of
initiative, poor concentration and paranoid thoughts”.81 These symptoms show that not
only is personal development negatively impacted by surveillance, but the body itself
also suffers. In fact, the description offered by Abed is fairly consistent with symptoms
used to diagnose depression. Anyone who’s ever known a depressed person or has been
depressed himself is aware of the strain it puts on relationships, both intra and inter
personally.

If symptoms consistent with depression manifest themselves under

surveillance, we have good reason to suspect those living in surveillance states (or who
perceive themselves to be) will suffer similarly devastating outcomes as a result of their
symptoms; e.g., hindering or preventing altogether an individual’s ability to form and
develop relationships. Thus, even if we can only build a modern Panopticon through
metaphor, the nasty outcomes are analogous enough to warrant concern despite the
80
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relevant dissimilarities between our Panoptic case and Bentham and Foucault’s iteration.
As a result, we can reject the idea of an apparently flourishing community as portrayed in
the Minderbinder defense.

The Safety Objection
Functionally, it is a feature, not a defect of the Panopticon that it keeps subjects in
a constant state of vulnerability, but one might object that vulnerability is not
synonymous with living a ‘bad’ life. Perhaps in our metaphorical Panopticon mildly
inconvenient psychological vulnerability is a necessary tradeoff for safety. That is, we
would actually be more vulnerable without the intruding eye of mass surveillance
because we live in a world composed of people and things out to harm us and we need
some sort of watchman to protect us.

Consider the hermit crab, safe in his shell,

invulnerable to the plodding feet of uncoordinated beachgoers. We could even accept
that it’s a point of pride for the crab that he can survive in this tiny shell, but if he were
rational, would he not trade it in, in exchange for the safety of a tank and life under the
watchful eye of a dutiful pet owner? There’s no surer safety than that, and if the deshelled hermit crab is analogous to citizens under surveillance, maybe surveillance is the
least bad option.
Of course, I haven’t come this far to suddenly about-face and endorse
surveillance. Absent from arguments about how our vulnerability may be a necessary
inconvenience for the benefit of greater overall safety is a concern for how that
vulnerability might simply lead to overwhelming paranoia. More than just a derogatory
diagnosis for the guilty man, paranoia manifests itself in mental and physical illnesses
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(surely not safe insofar as safety implies a kind of robust comfort). A man under constant
surveillance, unable to fully relax and reflect, will surely experience an uptick in stress.
In fact, “Researchers have found that as surveillance increases, so does anxiety. Anxiety
can lead to a host of health conditions, including high blood pressure, obesity, respiratory
problems, gastrointestinal problems, and even cancer”.82 Thus, we ought to be suspicious
of the very promise of safety through surveillance, given, at a certain point, surveillance
does more to harm those it ‘protects’ than it does to prevent harms from those it aims to
catch and deter. Additionally, as we saw with the Panopticon, the existence of increased
surveillance is not even necessary for one to experience increased anxiety. The mere
perception of an increase in surveillance is enough to harm a person’s quality of life.
This is not to say all surveillance should be eliminated, but the mental health angle does
put a larger burden on the observing party to ensure the harm inflicted on its subjects is
not greater than the harm prevented through its surveillance techniques. Many modern
day surveillance tools and techniques—backdoor access to phones and laptops or mass
data collection and storage—plausibly fail to generate benefits that exceed the harms they
inflict, and, thus, ought to be eliminated. Short of abandoning surveillance altogether, we
should at least reevaluate our practices while giving greater deference to personal
development and mental health.
We should also take care to consider the interests of members of the population
not under surveillance at all. Remember, according to the Panopticon story, from a
subjective perspective, there is no way to conclusively prove one is free from
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surveillance. Thus, mass surveillance has major ramifications even for those outside of
its purview since they can never be sure they actually are outside at all. Further, once it
gains momentum in a world where some people are right to be paranoid, mass paranoia is
not easily cured because, in the immortal words of Kurt Cobain, “Just because you’re
paranoid don’t mean they’re not after you.”83 For our own sake, we should at least reject
an unqualified, positive correlation between surveillance and safety, and aim to be more
discriminating in our application of surveillance on the whole.
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Chapter 8: A Prescriptive Account

I should preface this with a disclaimer: I am not an expert on law or technology. I
could offer a detailed, technical, legislative solution to the problem I have just used
seventy pages to outline, but it seems to me that to solve in a single page or two a
problem that takes 20,000 words to adequately explain is to rather carelessly ignore a
multitude of factors that must be weighed for appropriate resolution. Further, I would
hate to get too specific and initiate a sort of modern ‘Four Pests’ campaign. That is to
say, just as Mao thought he could reverse China’s poor crop yields by exterminating the
sparrows that actually ate the insects most responsible for bad harvests, I may also offer a
solution that appears to be a good remedy but actually causes a worse outcome.
What then is the point of this final chapter? Should we just hope for a devastating
solar flare or a nuclear holocaust to prevent the nasty blackmail outcome? While both of
those disasters would apparently eliminate the problem, it would be peculiar to prescribe
horrible destruction to avoid horrible destruction. I still believe, perhaps naively, that we
are not bound to the fate described herein. At the outset I described three necessary
conditions that must precede any attempt at corporate blackmail in order for it to be
effective. If I’ve been convincing enough, and if the problem is troubling enough, then
we ought to work toward altering at least one of those conditions such that the
groundwork for blackmail is non-existent.

This is an intentionally vague solution

because, as I stated earlier, I do not want to commit myself to a plan while lacking the
requisite knowledge of the legal system and technological field to fully understand the
repercussions.
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Just to remind you, here are the original three conditions I labeled necessary for a
successful blackmail campaign:
1. It must be the case that powerful institutions can collect and process massive
amounts of data/metadata on a wide swath of citizens.
2. It must also be the case that powerful institutions use utilitarian criteria for
what counts as right and wrong, which causes them to overlook the value of privacy.
3. Game Theory should suggest that blackmail is a likely progression from mass
data collection and mining that currently exists.

This should even apply to those

institutions that were previously ethically opposed to data collection and blackmail.
Alter one of these even slightly and you create a butterfly effect that ripples across
time and changes the outcome. Now, whether you change that outcome for better or
worse depends on what alterations are made to the conditions, but to think we are bound
to the fate I have predicted is to view life as overly deterministic. As I’ve repeated
throughout this paper, people are not simple chemical reactions. We have the capacity to
reason and make value judgments and as a result, we should not see ourselves as
passengers strapped along for the terrible ride, but rather conductors and engineers who
can control the twists and turns (albeit with varying degrees of certainty) to forge a better
experience.

76

Works Cited
Abed, Riadh T. British Medical Bulletin 72.1 (2004): 1-13. Web. 29 Nov. 2016.
Anthony, Sebastian. "Supercomputer Predicts Egyptian Revolution, Bin Laden’s
Location | ExtremeTech." ExtremeTech. N.p., 12 Sept. 2011. Web. 04 Oct. 2016.
Benn, Stanley I. A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988. Print.
Blackburn, Simon W. "The Later Wittgenstein." Encyclopedia Britannica Online.
Encyclopedia Britannica. Web. 29 Apr. 2015.
Borland, John. "Maybe Surveillance Is Bad, After All." Wired. Conde Nast, 8 Aug. 2007.
Web. 29 Nov. 2016.
Bragues, George. "Business Is One Thing, Ethics Is Another: Revisiting Bernard
Mandeville's "The Fable of the Bees"" Business Ethics Quarterly15.2 (2005):
179-203. Web. 27 Sept. 2016.
Brock, Isaac. Edit the Sad Parts. Modest Mouse. Steve Wold, 1996. CD.
Byron, Michael. Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004. Web. 29 Apr. 2015.
Cobain, Kurt, David Grohl, and Krist Novoselic. Territorial Pissings. Nirvana. DGC,
1991. MP3.
Crawford, Kate, and Jason Schultz. "Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms." Boston College Law Review 55.93 (n.d.): 93128. Web. 27 Sept. 2016.
Dixon, M. "Normative Ethical Theories." Normative Ethical Theories. Web. 29 Apr.
2015.
Duhigg, Charles. "How Companies Learn Your Secrets." The New York Times. The New
York Times, 18 Feb. 2012. Web. 04 Oct. 2016.
Eisinger, Jesse. "Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis." The
New York Times. The New York Times, 30 Apr. 2014. Web. 01 Mar. 2017.
Ellsberg, Daniel. The Theory and Practice of Blackmail. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1968.
Web. 28 Jan. 2017.
Emami, Mostafa, and Kamran Nazari. "Entrepreneurship, Religion, and Business
Ethics."Australian Journal of Business and Management Research 1.11 (2012):
59-69. Web. 6 Mar. 2017.

77

Fassin, Yves. "The Reasons Behind Non-Ethical Behaviour in Business and
Entrepreneurship." Journal of Business Ethics 60.3 (2005): 265-79. Web. 27 Sept.
2016.
Foucault, Michel. "Discipline and Punish, Panopticism." In Discipline & Punish: The
Birth of the Prison, edited by Alan Sheridan, 195-228. New York: Vintage Books,
1977.
Gahir, Bruce, and Stefano Cavagnetto. Pluralistic Virtue Ethics and the Corporate
Community. Web. 29 Apr. 2015.
Gaus, Gerald F. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a
Diverse and Bounded World. New York: Cambridge UP, 2011. Print.
Green, Jon. "Facebook Knows You're Gay before You Do." AMERICAblog News Gay
RSS. N.p., 24 Mar. 2013. Web. 04 Oct. 2016.
Griffith, Dave. "Psycho – Classic Hitchcock Horror Turns 50." Psycho – Classic
Hitchcock Horror Turns 50 | Voxy.co.nz. Voxy, 14 June 2010. Web. 13 Jan. 2017.
Heller, Joseph. Catch-22. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961. Print.
Hombach, Jean-Pierre. Eminem. N.p.: Hombach, 2012. Print.
Jake and Amir: IOU. Dir. Jake Penn Cooper Hurwitz and Amir Shmuel Blumenfeld.
Perf. Jake Hurwitz and Amir Blumenfeld. College Humor, 10 Mar. 2011. Web. 28
Jan. 2017.
Kant, Immanuel, and James W. Ellington. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1981. Print.
Kermode, Mark. "Psycho: The Best Horror Film of All Time." The 25 Best Horror Films
of All Time. Guardian News and Media, 22 Oct. 2010. Web. 13 Jan. 2017.
Kraut, Richard. "Aristotle's Ethics." Stanford University. Stanford University, 01 May
2001. Web. 29 Apr. 2015.
Levy, Steven. "Bill Gates and President Bill Clinton on the NSA, Safe Sex, and
American Exceptionalism." Wired. Conde Nast, 12 Nov. 2013. Web. 27 Feb.
2017.
Longhine, Laura. "Display Cases." Legal Affairs. Legal Affairs, Nov. 2005. Web. 27
Sept. 2016.

78

McDowell, John Henry. "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the
World." Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998. 112-30.
Print.
"Milo Minderbinder." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, n.d. Web. 28 Jan. 2017.
Playboy Interview: Joseph Heller. Playboy, June 1975. In: Joseph Heller and Adam J.
Sorkin: Conversations with Joseph Heller. University Press of Mississippi,
Jackson 1993, ISBN 0-87805-635-1, pg. 150.
Pulp Fiction. Dir. Quentin Tarantino. By Quentin Tarantino. Prod. Lawrence Bender.
Perf. Samuel L. Jackson and Uma Thurman. Miramax, 1995.
Rachels, James. “Why Privacy Is Important.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 4, no. 4,
1975, pp. 323–333.
Rainie, Lee, and Mary Madden. "How People Are Changing Their Own Behavior." Pew
Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. N.p., 16 Mar. 2015. Web. 29 Nov.
2016.
Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949. Print.
Samuelsohn, Darren. "Fact: Drumpf Claimed Climate Change Is a Hoax Created by
China." POLITICO. N.p., 26 Sept. 2016. Web. 04 Feb. 2017.
Schneier, Bruce. Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control
Your World. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2015. Print.
Skyrms, Brian. "Evolution and the Social Contract." Social Dynamics (2014): 49-69.
Web. 28 Jan. 2017.
Solove, Daniel J. The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet.
New Haven: Yale UP, 2007. Print.
Spicer, Andrew. "The Normalization of Corrupt Business Practices: Implications for
Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT)." J Bus Ethics Journal of Business
Ethics 88.S4 (2009): 833-40. Web. 27 Sept. 2016.
Su, Jessica, Sharad Goel, Ansh Shukla, and Arvind Narayanan. "De-anonymizing Web
Browsing Data with Social Networks." (2017): 291-304. Web. 17 Feb. 2017.
Taylor, Charles. Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Human Agency and Language.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985. Web.
Villines, Zawn. "Watch Out: The Psychological Effects of Mass Surveillance." Good
Therapy. N.p., 16 Sept. 2013. Web. 29 Nov. 2016.

79

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1968. Print.
Zagzebski, Linda. "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems." The Philosophical
Quarterly 44.174 (1994): 65-73. Web. 16 Oct. 2016.

80

